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An analysis of 2006 census data and a series of 33 employer interviews are used to test 
four apparently influential assumptions in current Canadian apprenticeship policy and research. 
These are that: (a) apprenticeship is the main source of skill supply for trades occupations; (b) 
employers of apprentices are generally high investors in workplace training; (c) the costs and 
risks of workplace training are a deterrent to employer  participation; and (d), as a general 
description, the apprenticeship system in Canada consists of a productive core of employer-
delivered, workplace-based training, supported by a variety of publicly-provided services.  
Literature 
These assumptions are clearly evident in the academic literature and popular media, and 
form the basis for current federal and provincial policies, including financial incentives for 
apprenticeship participants. Yet the Canadian literature offers little or no analysis of the premises 
themselves, and few resources for investigating them. In popular and official discourse, terms 
such as ““the trades” and “apprenticeship” are used casually and often interchangeably, 
reinforcing a perception that low participation and completion rates in apprenticeship constitute a 
crisis in the skills supply. Investigating the “trades”/”apprenticeship” relationship has been 
impeded by imprecise and non-aligned data classification systems, a problem partly resolved by 
the 2006 census. The apparent under-performance of apprenticeship in Canada is conventionally 
explained in terms of market failure, caused by supply-side “barriers” that deter investment by 
employers and/or trainees. The federal apprenticeship job creation tax credit (AJCTC) aims to 
offset the deterrent risks ostensibly incurred by employers of apprentices. Again, research into 
the nature and actual deterrent effect of such barriers is limited. A common weakness has been 
the extrapolation of participant characteristics (based on survey and focus-group data) onto non-
participants. Research on employer costs and risks is also limited and inconclusive.  The 
Canadian Apprenticeship Forum’s (2006) estimates of the cost of apprenticeship to employers 
appear excessive on methodological and theoretical grounds, and are inconsistent with other 
empirical research.  
Research methods and findings 
Assumption (a) was tested by examining 2006 census data on occupation and educational 
attainment. Of the total adult labour force in 74 “trades” occupations (NOC-S group H), the 
proportion found to hold an apprenticeship qualification is 37%, slightly smaller than the 
proportion with education below the apprenticeship level (39%). When certificates granted to 
“trade qualifiers” are excluded from the total, registered apprenticeship certification is found to 
contribute roughly 25% of the skilled trades labour supply. The data further reveal strong inter-
occupational differences in the certification rate and in the ratio of certified to less-than-certified 
workers, suggesting a de facto hierarchy of trades occupations. In a small number of occupations 
at the “top” of the hierarchy (mainly in electrical and pipe trades), workers who hold 
apprenticeship certification make up at least 50% of the labour force, and outnumber uncertified 
workers by a ratio of 2:1 or more. The remaining occupations show a  progressively lower  
prevalence of apprenticeship certification, and higher proportions of uncertified workers. The 
census findings demonstrate, first, that the apprenticeship system is not the principal source of 
labour for most “trades” occupations, and secondly, that the labour market’s uptake of 
apprenticeship-trained workers varies strongly by occupation.  
 
In-person interviews with 33 employers of trades workers were used to investigate the 
remaining three assumptions, and the occupational patterns revealed in the census research. The 
interviews are not a survey, but rather a source of insight into employers’ training and HR 
strategies, based on structured discussions of their investment behaviour, business 
characteristics, perceptions, and understandings. Premise (b) is countered by the discovery of 
sharp variations in employers’ workplace training efforts, within and across occupations. On the 
basis of the interview data, the employers are categorized as high or low investors in workplace 
training, and assigned to several subgroups reflecting distinct strategies. These are interpreted as 
rational adaptations to differing product markets and regulatory constraints. Despite this diversity 
of practice, and contrary to assumption (c), all of the participating employers are evidently able 
to minimize training-related risk. Finally, the diverse employer practices are interpreted as a 
challenge to assumption (d) which depicts the apprenticeship system as a rather monolithic 
institution, centred on employer-delivered training, and (imperfectly) protected from market 
failure by public policies and services. Instead, the interviews reveal that labour market actors 
incorporate the institutional resources of the apprenticeship system into a range of distinct 
interest strategies, with diverse consequences for skill formation. While these strategies respond 
to a variety of demand-side conditions mentioned above, they also capitalize in different ways on 
distinct institutional facets of the apprenticeship system, including wage-setting, 
registration/indentureship, certification, and in-class technical training.  
Conclusions and implications 
The findings challenge a policy orientation in Canada that has arguably overestimated the 
contribution of apprenticeship to the labour supply, while underestimating the diversity of labour 
market actors’ training behaviour and the nature of their engagement with the institutions of 
apprenticeship. The findings point to a research agenda that, on the one hand, would further 
investigate the diversity of needs, capabilities, and strategies for skill formation in the industrial 
labour market, and on the other would help put current Canadian practice into historical and 
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Canadian apprenticeship policy has recently turned to direct subsidies for participants, 
including a federal tax incentive for employers. Some assumptions underlying the employer 
subsidy are: that apprenticeship training is a principal contributor to the skilled trades labour 
supply; that employers of apprentices typically incur high training cost and risks; and that in the 
absence of offsetting incentives, these would deter their participation. These assumptions are 
tested, using an analysis of 2006 census data and a series of 33 employer interviews. The census 
data reveal that, in 74 “skilled trades” occupations (NOC-S group H), the proportion of the 
labour force reporting an apprenticeship credential is 37%. When certificates granted to “trade 
qualifiers” are excluded from the total, registered apprenticeship certification is found to 
contribute roughly 25% of the skilled trades labour supply. A closer examination of the census 
data reveals strong inter-occupational differences in the certification rate and in the ratio of 
certified to less-than-certified workers, suggesting a de facto hierarchy of trades occupations. 
The interviews reveal sharp variations in employers’ workplace training efforts, challenging the 
twin  suppositions that employers of apprentices are uniformly high contributors to skill 
formation, and  that  high training-related  costs  risks  generally deter  their participation. 
Differences in training behaviour are attributed to high-skill versus low-skill business strategies 
that in turn reflect differing product markets and regulatory constraints. Whatever the level of 
their training effort, all of the participating employers are able to minimize the training-related 
risks that have been cited as the principal rationale for employer subsidies. The paper argues for 
a more nuanced approach to skills policy and research in Canada, with greater attention to the 
diversity of actors’ strategic interactions with the training system.   
Keywords:  Apprenticeship, Skill, Trades, Training, Labour Supply, Canada 
JEL Code:  J21, J23, J24, L23, L88, Z13 
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INTRODUCTION & LITERATURE REVIEW 
For decades, the Canadian apprenticeship system has been characterized in academic 
research, the popular media, and public policy discourse as an institution in crisis (Economic 
Council of Canada, 1992; Sharpe, 2005). In the face of apparently strong demand for trades 
labour, the apprenticeship system’s persistently weak performance has been regarded as posing 
an imminent (or actual) crisis of supply. This in turn has been attributed to a variety of market-
disrupting “barriers” that impede employers’ and workers’ participation. Urgently seeking to 
raise registration rates, current policies seek to overcome these investment obstacles by directly 
subsidizing apprenticeship participants. The Apprenticeship Incentive Grant and the 
Tradesperson Tool Tax Credit to  address  purported  financial barriers for trainees, while the 
Apprenticeship Job Creation Tax Credit (AJCTC) subsidizes employers for indenturing 
apprentices. This policy orientation appears to rest on a set of assumptions about the labour 
market and the apprenticeship system that might be schematized as follows:  
(a) Apprenticeship is the principal source of labour for skilled trades 
occupations.  
(b) Apprenticeship depends crucially on practical training that employers 
provide in the workplace.  
(c) Employers’ workplace training efforts typically carry substantial costs and 
risks that are a deterrent to their participation.  
(d) The institutions, services and policies of the public apprenticeship system 
serve as ancillary supports to a productive core of training provided by 
employers in the workplace.  
The research presented here challenges this argument on both empirical and conceptual 
grounds. Part 1 investigates the first premise by examining 2006 census data on educational 
attainment by occupation. Within the broad group of occupations conventionally defined as 
“trades,” apprenticeship is found to be a relatively minor contributor to the labour supply, and 
indeed certified workers in these occupations are slightly outnumbered by those with education 
below the level of apprenticeship. However, the census  data also reveal dramatic inter-
occupational variations in the patterns of educational attainment, raising questions about 
differences in employers’ skill requirements. In Part 2, interview research is presented to explore 
these differences and to pursue the second and third assumptions. Contrary to claim (b), the 
interviews reveal that employers’ workplace training practices and investments range widely 
from the substantial to the negligible. With respect to claim (c), the interviews suggest further 
that, whatever their actual levels of workplace training investment, the respondent employers are 
generally able to manage and minimize training-related risk by assuming one of several distinct 
business strategies. Claim (d) is taken up in the final section of the paper, which proposes an 
alternate conception of the contemporary Canadian apprenticeship system: not as a relatively 
uniform system of employer-delivered training with ancillary public supports, but rather as an 
array of institutional resources that economic actors (including employers and workers) 
incorporate into diverse strategies, with different direct and indirect effects. In this context, some 
of the apprenticeship system’s strategically important resources include its mechanisms of  
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indentureship, wage-setting, in-class technical training, and certification. The study calls for a 
broader and more nuanced vision in skills policy and research. An alternate perspective would 
look beyond registration and completion rates to other indicators, mechanisms, and objectives 
related to apprenticeship; and, more importantly, beyond apprenticeship to a broader view of the 
skill supply and skill formation processes in the contemporary Canadian labour market.  
Literature 
For a variety of reasons, the literature on apprenticeship to date does not make it easy to 
substantiate, or even to investigate, the four separate premises or the overall policy narrative 
outlined above. To begin with claim (a), the actual impact of apprenticeship training on the 
labour market has been very difficult to assess, partly due to the ambiguity of key terms and 
categories used in the field. In common  speech, terms like “the trades,”  “skilled trades,” 
“apprenticeable trades,” “apprenticeship,” and “vocational training” are often used casually and 
almost interchangeably in general reference to a broad realm of manual work and sub-
baccalaureate training. A general affinity between trades and apprenticeship seems to be taken 
for granted in popular discourse, but the exact boundaries of the two fields and the nature of the 
connection between them remain vague. The categories of the main data sources for social 
research have also made it difficult to study the relationship between skilled trades occupations 
and apprenticeship training. Category H of the National Occupational Classification (NOC-S) 
covers  “Trades, Transport and Equipment Operators and Related Occupations” but does not 
specifically define the distinction between “trades” and other occupations. Nor is the connection 
with apprenticeship clear or predictable. Among the Group H  occupations, some  are 
apprenticeable (in some provinces/territories); some are recognized inter-provincially under the 
Red Seal system; and others are not apprenticeable at all. Meanwhile, apprenticeship and Red 
Seal certification are available for some occupations outside of Group H, such as cooking and 
hairdressing.  
The 2006 version of the census, which allows respondents to indicate “apprenticeship” as 
their highest level of education, contributes greatly to research on this topic, making it possible 
for the first time to gauge the rate of apprenticeship certification within specific occupations. The 
picture is sharpened further by new information from the Registered Apprenticeship Information 
System (RAIS) (Statistics Canada 2010) that makes it possible to distinguish between certificates 
granted to apprenticeship completers and “trade qualifiers.”  
The second premise of the dominant policy narrative has also eluded substantive 
research. As the apprenticeship model is obviously oriented to work-related skills, and depends 
fundamentally on workplace-based learning, it is commonly portrayed as a system of training 
delivered primarily by employers. For example, Statistics Canada’s (2008) introduction to its 
National Apprentice Survey  (NAS)  report  describes apprenticeship as  “a combination of 
practical on-the-job training (80%) and intensive in-school technical training (20%).” While this 
description captures the usual ratio of in-class to workplace time in apprenticeship programs, the 
proportion of training  that occurs in the workplace  is  an important  question for empirical 
investigation. The intensity of workplace training in apprenticeship is scarcely broached in the 
literature, or examined empirically in the standard apprenticeship research. While several 
questions on the NAS were related to on-the-job training, the results were not reported in the 
official summaries and have yet to be published elsewhere. The RAIS (Statistics Canada, 2004) 
collects no information relevant to the issue, suggesting that provincial apprenticeship authorities  
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may have little systematic knowledge of the quality of workplace training in their jurisdictions. 
Where apprentices have been surveyed on the topic (e.g. Government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 2004), most have expressed satisfaction with their workplace experience; however, it 
is unknown what (if anything) such reports reveal about inputs made by employers, or how 
apprentices’ perceptions compare with those of other, non-apprenticed workers who are also 
learning in the workplace.  
The third premise in the above argument builds on the second, interpreting employers’ 
supposedly intense involvement in workplace training as a source of costs and risks that deter 
them from participating (Sharpe and Gibson, 2005:63-64; CAF, 2004). This view reflects a 
dominant theme in the apprenticeship research literature, which traces chronic problems of low 
enrolment and completion to a variety of “barriers” encountered by learners and/or employers 
(CAF, 2004; Conference Board of Canada, 2002; Betcherman et al, 2000). A common limitation 
for research into the barriers thesis, however has been its dependence on data derived from 
individuals already participating in apprenticeship. Survey and focus group research with 
apprentices and employers has queried the groups ostensibly least affected by barriers, and then 
extrapolated their views and experiences onto non-participants (GPC International, 2001; CAF, 
2004).  
In a notable recent effort, the Canadian Apprenticeship Forum has added a quantitative 
dimension to the barriers thesis by calculating the value of employers’ inputs to workplace 
training. In its 2006 study the CAF reported that employers invest an average of $207,000 per 
trainee over the term of a four-year apprenticeship, but also that (on a completed apprenticeship) 
this investment is repaid at the rate of $1.38 for every dollar spent. These estimates seem to serve 
dual purposes: on the one hand, the CAF has incorporated them into a public relations effort that 
promotes employer participation by demonstrating the profitability of employing apprentices. On 
the other, the initial cost estimate conveys a powerful impression that employers of apprentices 
are exceptionally high-value and (considering the rate of apprentice attrition) high-risk investors 
in workplace training. As such, the CAF estimate bolsters the case for public subsidies that 
would offset employers’ costs.  
There are good reasons to treat the CAF’s cost estimates with caution. In the first place, 
its  study is weakened by both of the issues described above: it  covered only employers of 
apprentices, generating no basis for comparison with other employers of the same occupations; 
and it estimated an average level of employer investment across the entire population rather than 
reporting variations that might be correlated with employer characteristics or other factors. More 
fundamentally, however, the CAF methodology seems to have systematically overestimated the 
cost of training, partly by treating the time that journeypersons spend with apprentices as a pure 
cost with no productive value.
1
                                                 
1 In the case of automotive service technicians, the CAF reported that the value of lost journeyperson time in Year 1 is over 
$32,000, implying that for well over half of the apprentice's first year the supervising journeyperson is entirely unproductive. 
Over the four-year apprenticeship, there is a loss of almost two full years of journeyperson salary. 
 Theoretically, the study is at odds with the basic economic 
principle that, in an open labour market, employers will always pass training costs onto 
employees in the form of lower wages (Becker, 1964, ch. 2). Empirically, as well, the CAF 
estimates are unconvincing. In a study of skilled workers at an industrial construction site in 
Northern Alberta, Robinson Fayek and her colleagues (2003) found that apprentices were highly 
productive in many tasks; that combining apprentices with journeypersons on work teams 
actually enhanced team productivity; and that on those tasks where apprentices were less  
 
7 
productive, their lower wages more than compensated for their lower productivity. In his recent 
review of apprenticeship literature, Gunderson (2009:33) cites two studies that also found that 
the employment of apprentices in German firms had a generally positive effect on productivity. 
The view of employers as generally high investors in workplace learning is also contested by 
apprentices. The NAS shows that over 15% of apprentices reported having worked for at least 
some time with no journeyperson supervision   and six to eight percent of apprentices reported 
that a lack of journeyperson supervision had impeded their progress toward completion 
(Statistics Canada,  2008: Table A.1.8.1.1).  In a recent survey of Saskatchewan apprentices 
(Meredith, 2009), more than one fifth cited lack of workplace learning opportunities as an 
obstacle to completion, and fewer than 10% reported receiving financial assistance from their 
employers during their in-class training. 
An alternate line of apprenticeship research has associated low participation and 
completion rates, not with market-distorting barriers, but with lack of labour market demand. 
Gunderson (2001) found, for instance, that the rate of trade certification was much lower in the 
single-family residential than in the commercial/institutional sector of the construction industry 
in Ontario, reflecting an environment of price-based competition among small, non-unionized 
contractors with narrow profit margins and low capital inputs. That market and regulatory 
environment, it seemed, did not entail the demand for skill or certification that would make it 
rational for either employers or workers to invest in apprenticeship training. Potential correlates 
of labour market demand for apprenticeship-level skills include industry sector, firm size, 
unionization, and regulations mandating trade certification as a prerequisite to employment in 
particular occupations.  
In British Columbia, where the field research for this project was undertaken, labour 
market  interest groups have fiercely debated whether  unionization and compulsory trades 
regulations promote industrial training and certification by creating demand, or suppress them by 
erecting barriers to participation (e.g., MacNeill, 1994; Fenn, 2000; Canadian Union of Public 
Employees, 2003). Since 2001, BC has introduced ambitious reforms to create an “industry-
driven” apprenticeship system (BC Ministry of Advanced Education, 2002). The roots of the 
reform lie in the province’s historically polarized industrial relations environment. One legacy 
from the labour tensions that preceded the 1986 world fair in Vancouver (Expo ’86) was a 
weakening of organized labour’s traditional  dominance  of  industrial and commercial 
construction. Where “craft” unions (organized on occupational lines) had formerly dominated the 
sector, a series of changes to labour law permitted the entry of non-unionized employers as well 
as signatories to “industrial” unions (representing workers of multiple occupations). 
 Advocates of the open-shop movement were also instrumental in framing the reforms 
represented in the prevailing, “New Model” of apprenticeship in B.C. These included the lifting 
of any enforceable obligations that an apprenticeship registration agreement imposed on the 
employer, and the rescinding of legislation that directly mandated trade certification for 
particular occupations. Under the present system, certification is not a legal requirement for 
workers in any apprenticeable trade in the province, although it is indirectly mandated in several 
cases through safety legislation. In the automotive sector, trade certification is a prerequisite for 
becoming an Authorized Vehicle Inspector.
2
                                                 
2 
  Regular safety inspections are compulsory  for 
http://www.llbc.leg.bc.ca/public/PubDocs/bcdocs/369550/MV3065_Booklet_3.pdf   
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commercial vehicles, but not for most private automobiles. Mechanics who do not perform 
official inspections do not require certification, and repair shops that choose not to offer 
inspection services are under no obligation to employ certified workers. Similarly, in the 
electrical and some pipe fitting trades the Safety Authority Act (2003) specifies a journeyperson 
credential as one of the acceptable prerequisites for becoming an authorized Field Safety 
Representative. FSR certification is required by anyone applying for an electrical or gas permit 
for a construction project, but the legislation allows various kinds of piping and electrical work 
to be performed by non-certified personnel. There is no legal requirement for certification in 
other apprenticeable trades in British Columbia. 
The question of labour market demand opens intriguing avenues for apprenticeship 
research, arguably at a more fundamental level than the competing “barriers” thesis. By focusing 
attention on actors’ investment behaviour, the demand thesis does not simply initiate a search for 
the environmental factors that determine the payoffs to apprenticeship. It also raises the 
possibility that different actors may engage with the apprenticeship system in different ways in 
the pursuit of their particular interests.  
 
PART 1  CENSUS RESEARCH: Apprenticeship and the trades skill supply 
Methodology 
Data from the 2006 census of Canada were analyzed to determine the proportion of 
workers in apprenticeable occupations who report apprenticeship training as their highest 
educational credential. The analysis was confined to occupations in NOC-S 2006 category H: 
“Trades, Transport and Equipment Operators and Related Occupations.” According to the census 
data dictionary the “Apprenticeship” educational category includes all journeyperson certificates, 
including those earned through a challenge process rather than apprenticeship. Although it is 
understood that category H neither consists exclusively of apprenticeable occupations nor lists 
every occupation for which apprenticeship training is available, it does cover the trades in which 
the majority of apprenticeship training in the country is provided (CCDA, 2008). The analysis 




The census data provide an unprecedented view of educational attainment, including 
apprenticeship certification, in the skilled trades labour force in Canada. Appendix tables A1 and 
A2 present the distributions for each of the 74 occupations by count and percentage. For clarity, 
the original 10 census categories for “Highest certificate, diploma or degree” are collapsed into 
six. The tables permit the following, initial observations:  
•  The proportion of the Canadian labour force 15 years and over who report 
apprenticeship as their highest level of education is 11.7%. 
•  Across the 74 selected trades occupations the mean proportion of workers 
reporting apprenticeship as their highest credential is 37%.  
•  The mean proportion holding a credential lower than apprenticeship is 38.6%.  
•  The proportion of workers with apprenticeship varies considerably by trade, from a 
high of 60.8% among gas fitters to a low of 20.8% for painters and roofers.  
•  Within the 28 Red Seal trades in the data set, 40% of workers report apprenticeship 
credentials..  
•  In the five Red Seal trades with the greatest registration volume, the average 
proportion of workers with apprenticeship rises to 45%. In the same occupations, 
on average, workers with less than apprenticeship make up 27% of the labour force.  
 
While the census data shed  new light on  rates  of  certification  among  skilled trades 
workers,  they  overstate  the  contribution of workplace-based  apprenticeship  training.  In all 
jurisdictions in Canada trade certification  is granted not only to registered apprentices who 
complete their program, but also to “trade qualifiers” who demonstrate employment experience 
in the trade (typically 1.5 times the normal apprenticeship period) and pass a written exam. The 
census fails to distinguish between these groups, but the difference can be roughly estimated 
with the help of administrative data from the Registered Apprenticeship Information System 
(RAIS). A recent study of RAIS data (Statistics Canada 2010) found that approximately 35% of 
trade certificates granted by provincial authorities for the period 1991 to 2006 had gone to trade 
qualifiers. Applying this rate to all trade certificates captured by the census, the mean percentage 
of workers in group H occupations who earned trade certification through an apprenticeship 
declines  to under 25%. Table A3 presents both the census and RAIS data to estimate the 
proportions  of workers in selected occupations  who have earned certification through an 
apprenticeship.  
Interoccupational differences 
The census data reveal striking  variations in the in the apprenticeship mechanism’s 
contribution to the labour supply across the 74 group H occupations. Charts A1 through A4 
(appendix) explore these differences from several perspectives. Chart A1 lists the occupations 
according to the sheer prevalence of apprenticeship certification among workers in them, while 
A2 lists them according to their apparent ability to exclude non-certified workers. As will be  
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seen below, a small number of occupations, particularly in electrical and pipe trades, rank highly 
in terms of both prevalence and exclusivity.   
Chart A3 highlights the proportions of workers in each occupation who hold credentials 
higher than apprenticeship. The presence of more highly educated workers in a generally low-
attaining labour force might be evidence of “wasted training” (Livingstone, 1996) or, perhaps, of 
specialized industry niches which demand higher levels of certification. For several occupations 
(e.g., Industrial power system electricians, Power station operators, Stationary engineers, Aircraft 
mechanics, and several telecommunications occupations)  the proportion of workers with 
certification  at the college/CEGEP level is as great or greater than the share with trade 
certification. For these occupations, it is apparent that both apprenticeship and college/CEGEP 
training are possible routes to employment. Because the census educational  categories are 
understood as a hierarchy, it is not possible to tell how many of the higher-qualified workers may 
have held an apprenticeship qualification that later became “hidden” under a higher credential. 
University degrees are fairly rare among workers in NOC group H occupations. Further research 
would be required to understand the roles of apprenticeship and other educational options in 
these occupations. Whether the relatively high rates of university experience in some other 
occupations (e.g., Pest controller, Shoe maker, Jeweler), are evidence of under-employment, 
perhaps of foreign-trained professionals, is also a question for further research.   
To better indicate the quantitative impact of apprenticeship on the skill supply, Chart A4 
arranges the occupations by volume of employment.  Here, the occupations with a high 
prevalence of apprenticeship are scattered throughout the chart, revealing that trades with a high 
apprenticeship rate are not necessarily high employers. Across the 19 occupations that account 
for 75% of the employment in category H, the total proportion of workers who report an 
apprenticeship credential is 39.3%. In the nine occupations that account for half of the 
employment, the average rises slightly to 41%.  
Drawing on the preceding charts, Table 1 groups 53 apprenticeable occupations on two 
axes: by the prevalence of apprenticeship; and by the “exclusivity” of the occupation, understood 
as the ratio of apprenticeship credential holders to workers with a lower level of education. To 
help contextualize the information, Table  1  also highlights three other features of the listed 
occupations: Red type denotes  occupations where the interprovincial Red Seal is available; 
Boldface type indicates employment volume; together the eight, bolded occupations account for 
50%  of the employment in NOC-S category H; and Italic type indicates the volume of 
apprenticeship registration. The italicized occupations are the five Red Seal trades with the 








Table 1   Prevalence of apprentice training and exclusivity of occupations in NOC-S Group H   
    Prevalence  
Proportion of workers with apprenticeship as highest educational credential 



















































































































• 113 Gas fitters (61) 
• 322 Boilermakers (55) 
• 211 Electricians i54) 
• 111 Plumbers (54) 
•  112 Steam/pipe/spklr 
fitters (53) 
• 418 Elevator constructors (51) 
 
B 
• 214 Elect pwr  & cable wkrs (49) 
• 212 Industrial electricians (48) 
• 213 Power systm electricians (47) 
• 433 Electrical mechanics (47) 
• 413 Refrig & A/C mechs (46) 
• 411 Construction millwrights (46) 






















• Ironworkers (52) 
 
E 
• 326 Welders (49) 
• 412 HD Equip mechs (49) 
• 431 Oil & s.f. heating mechs (48) 
• 321 Sheet metal workers (48) 
• 421 Auto/bus/truck svc techs (47) 
• 434 Motorcycle mechanics (47) 
• 422 MV body repairers (44) 
• 311 Machinists (41) 
• 435 Small eng & equip mechs (40) 
• 432 Elect appliance repairers (39) 
• 416 Machine fitters (37) 
• 312 Tool & die makers (34) 
F     






















• 621 Crane operators-(41) 
• 131 Bricklayers (40) 
• 143 Insulators (37) 
• 121 Carpenters (34) 
• 323 Struct metal fabrctrs (32) 




• 222 Power syst/station oprtrs 
(22) 
• 534 Pest control & fumigtrs  (22) 
• 215 Telecom line cable wkrs (22) 
• 217 Cable television svc techs 
(19) 
• 514 Jewelers, watch repairers 
(19) 
• 216 Telecom instal & rpr wkrs 
(17) 
 
• 122 Cabinet makers (29) 
• 132 Concrete finishers (23) 
• 133 Tile setters (27) 
• 134 Plasterer/lathers (26) 
• 141 Roofers & shinglers (22) 
• 142 Glaziers (28) 
• 144 Painters & decorators (21) 
• 145 Floor covering installers (23) 
• 511 Upholsterers (19) 
• 532 Waterworks & gas mtnc wkrs 
(26) 
• 513 Shoe repair/makers (19) 
• 531 Resid & comm. installers (17) 
• 533 Automotive installers (14) 
• 535 Other repairers & svcrs (16) 
 
Bold: high employment volume  Red type: Red Seal available    Italic: high registration volume 
Percentage reporting trade certification is shown in parentheses.  Source: 2006 Census.  
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The top row of Table 1 lists occupations that are relatively exclusive, meaning that the 
ratio of workers with apprenticeship
3
In the less exclusive occupations in the middle row, apprenticed workers continue to 
outnumber those with high school graduation or less, but by a ratio of less than 2:1. In cell D the 
rate of apprenticeship in the Ironworker trade is over 50%. In the occupations  in Cell E, 
journeypersons account for between a third and a half of the labour force, with the remainder of 
employment divided about equally between higher and lower educated workers. In cell F, 
apprenticed workers make up a smaller proportion of the aircraft maintenance trade, which is 
dominated by workers with college-level credentials.  
 certification to those with less education is at least 2:1.  
Occupations in cell A are exclusive in this sense, but also have high prevalence in that 50% or 
more of the workforce holds apprenticeship certification as their highest educational credential. 
Cell A is dominated by electrical and pipe trades. Occupations in cell B are equally exclusive of 
low-educated workers, but here the proportion of apprenticeship graduates declines as the rate of 
higher credentials rises. The labour force in these occupations, mainly in electrical and industrial 
mechanics fields, is dominated by certified journeypersons, but also includes a substantial 
proportion of college/CEGEP and university graduates. 
Finally, the bottom row of Table 1 lists occupations where holders of apprenticeship 
certification are outnumbered by less-educated workers. In cell H journeypersons remain the 
second largest group by education. Cell I is divided into two subgroups: in the occupations above 
the line 30% or more of the workforce have credentials at the college level or higher. The 
occupations below the line – including seven Red Seal trades – are dominated by low-educated 
workers, with both apprenticed and higher-educated workers making up fairly small minorities.  
The patterns of apprenticeship prevalence and exclusivity revealed in Table 1 can be 
expected to correspond with other occupational characteristics such as rates of earnings, 
unionization, regulatory controls, industry sector, size of firm, and the nature and level of skills 
required. While specifying these sorts of relationship would take further research, even a cursory 
scan along the diagonal from cell A through cell I suggests a hierarchy of apprenticeable trades 
occupations arranged, among other ways, in order of declining technical intensiveness.  
Summary 
The 2006 census data reveal hitherto unknown patterns of educational attainment, with 
important implications for apprenticeship policy and research. The data clearly demonstrate that 
the apprenticeship system is not the principal source of labour for most occupations in NOC-S 
category H. Workers with apprenticeship as their highest credential make up somewhat more 
than one-third of the group-H labour force as a whole, and on average 40% in those occupations 
where Red Seal certification is available. A small number of trades particularly in electrical and 
pipe fields are relatively closed to workers with less than apprenticeship certification. However, 
in the majority, non-certified workers account for substantial proportions of the labour force, and 
in many cases outnumber those with apprenticeship qualifications. At the aggregate level, the 
census data dispel the commonly assumed equivalence of “the trades” and “apprenticeship. ” But 
they also reveal dramatic interoccupational differences in the labour market’s apparent valuation 
of apprenticeship credentials.  From a policy perspective these findings challenge the urgency of 
                                                 
3  In keeping with the 2006 census definitions, “apprenticeship certification” and “Journeyperson” here include both 
apprenticeship completers and trade qualifiers.   
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raising apprenticeship participation across the board as a means of securing the skills supply. 
They also call for a better understanding of the causes and consequences of these very uneven 
patterns of training and certification in the industrial labour force.  
 
Part 2  EMPLOYER INTERVIEW RESEARCH: Training inputs and perceptions of risk 
Employer interviews were used to investigate the second and third assumptions listed in 
the introduction –  i.e., that employers of apprentices generally incur substantial direct and 
indirect costs for the workplace training they provide, and that in the absence of offsetting 
incentives, the risk of failing to recover these costs would deter their participation. In addressing 
these issues, the interviews also reveal considerable diversity in employers’ approaches to 
utilizing and developing skill in the workplace, and in the nature of their engagement with the 
apprenticeship system.  
Methodology 
The guided interview was chosen as a data collection method appropriate to the time, 
budget, and exploratory purpose of the study (Kvale, 1996). The aim was to understand 
employers’ approaches to apprenticeship, including their specific training practices and related 
costs as well as their motivations, expectations, and values or rationales behind them. Face-to-
face interviews were held with 33 employers of trades workers in automotive and construction 
trades in metropolitan Vancouver and Victoria. In selecting target workplaces, the objectives 
were to cover a range of occupations from NOC-S Group H, including relatively high-
employment occupations; and, as far as possible, to include a variety of workplace characteristics 
for each occupation, including unionization, firm size, industry sector (e.g. public/private) and 
business model (e.g. independent/franchise).  The interviews targeted the senior representative(s) 
of each workplace directly responsible for hiring and supervising trades workers. Typical 
respondent positions were owner, service manager, production supervisor, superintendent, and 
foreman. All interviews were conducted at the employers’ workplaces, and followed a written 
guide. Interviews usually ran 60 to 90 minutes, and were audio recorded.  
Interview records, structured on the interview guide, were compiled from the field notes 
and audio files. Information from these records was further distilled into standardized workplace 
profiles  covering (a) general workplace characteristics (the type of enterprise; number of 
employees, journeypersons and apprentices; wage information; and regulatory factors relevant to 
training, including unionization and compulsory certification) and (b) indicators of training 
intensity. Appendix Table A4 lists the workplaces according to training intensity and subgroup, 
and summarizes the key indicators for each. The assessment of training intensity was based on 
several indicators including employers’ estimates of their direct and indirect training inputs and 
costs, such as the proportion of paid time spent by trainees in “unproductive” learning activities; 
the impact of training on the productivity of senior worker/mentors; direct costs such as tuition 
and wages for in-school training; and wasted materials. Note was also  taken of employers’ 
perceptions and rationales for training, including their sense of whether they incur a financial 
loss by employing trainees, and if so their reasons for tolerating it and/or for participating in  
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apprenticeship. To facilitate comparison and interpretation of the interview data, workplaces are 
rated high, medium, or low on three summary measures – Training practices, Training capacity, 
and Training ethos – each built from several interview questions. These summary measures are 
listed in the right-hand column of Table A4.  
Findings 
Before turning to the case descriptions, Tables 2  through  9 provide a numerical 
perspective on the participating workplaces. Clearly, the interviews cannot be considered a 
survey, and there is no statistical basis for inferences beyond the participant group. Nonetheless, 
the following tables help to describe the participant group, and reveal some internal relationships 
that are suggestive for further research.  
Table 2 presents frequency distributions of the key variables captured in the workplace 
profiles.  
Table 2   Workplace characteristics (distributions) 
Sector    Employees    Regulation    Training practices 
Construction  19  Under 10  13  None  8    High  10 
Automotive  14  10 to 25  10  Weak  12    Med  5 
Total  33  Over 25  10  Strong  13    Low  16 
    Total  33  Total  33    Total  31* 
Target trade  Apprentices  Training costs    Training capacity 
Carpenter  8  0  4  High  5    High  10 
Siding applicator  1  1-5  16  Med  5    Med  11 
Wall & ceiling  1  6-10  3  Low  23    Low  12 
Flooring installer  2  >10  8  Total  33    Total  33 
Plumber   1  Total  31           
Painter  1               
Electrician  3 
Union  Reports loss 
 
  Training ethos  Power line tech  1 
Auto svc tech  8  None  20  Yes  10    High  13 
HD/CV tech  4  Craft  7  No  21    Med  3 
Auto body tech  2  Industrial  4  Total  31    Low  17 
Multiple  1  Public sector  2        Total  33 
Total  33  Total  33           




Cross tabulations  
Table 3    Training practice by Trade 
  Trade 
Training practice  Carpenter  Flooring mech  Electrician  Auto svc tech  Auto body  HD/CV mech  Other 
High   1  1  2  2  0  3  1 
Med   2  0  0  3  0  0  0 
Low   5  1  1  3  2  1  3 
Within most of the trade groups covered by the interviews, there were examples of both higher 
and lower intensity training practices. 
 
Table 4   Training practice by Training capacity    Table 5   Training practice by Training ethos 
  Training capacity      Training ethos 
Training practice  High  Med  Low    Training practice  High  Med  Low 
High  9  1  0    High  10  0  0 
Med  1  4  0    Med  2  0  2 
Low  0  6  10    Low  0  2  14 
Among the participating employers, the intensity of training practices is clearly linked to both 
training capacity and ethos.  Respondents who provide substantial supports for workplace 
training also have the capacity to provide it, and they articulate a commitment to skill 
development and meaningful certification.   
 
Table 6   Training practice by Unionization 
  Unionization 
Training practice  Non-union  Craft  Industrial  Public 
High   4  4  1  1 
Med   4  1  0  0 
Low   11  2  3  1 
Historically, craft unions and producer associations have been strong defenders of apprenticeship 
and high-quality workplace training, for reasons of both group interest and capacity (see, e.g., 
Rock, 1995; Thompson, 1968; Williams, 1957 ch.1). It has been argued that the transformation 
from “craft” to “industrial” modes of production in North America seriously undermined the 
viability of apprenticeship (see, e.g. Seyboldt, 1917; Douglas,1921). In the visited workplaces, 
unionization per se does not guarantee high training intensity. It is true that the majority of both 
non-union and industrial-union firms had low levels of training practice. However, this was also 
true of two workplaces with craft union agreements. The group of ten workplaces with the most  
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intense training practices included four craft-union but also four non-union employers. Of the 
two workplaces organized under public-sector unions, one is a high-intensity investor while the 
other systematically declines to hire apprentices.  
 
Table 7   Training practice by Regulation 
  Regulation 
Training practice  Strong  Weak  None 
High  9  0  1 
Med  2  2  1 
Low  1  9  6 
Training behaviour is clearly related to regulatory environment. Of ten employers with the most 
intense training practices, nine operate under strong regulations, whether enshrined in legislation, 
collective agreements, or corporate/contractual obligations. By contrast, 15 of the  16 low-
intensity employers operate where training-related regulations are weak or absent.  
 
Table 8   Apprentice hiring by Training practice 
  Training practice 
Apprentice hiring  High  Med  Low 
High  20+  1  1  3 
Med  10-19  2  0  3 
Low  3-9  3  1  2 
Very low  <3  4  3  8 
Employers who hire large numbers of apprentices do not necessarily provide intense workplace 
training. Three of the five highest-volume employers of apprentices were rated as low-intensity 
trainers. On the other hand, among the ten respondents with high-intensity training practices, 
seven employ fewer than ten apprentices, and four employ fewer than three.  
 
Table 9   Perceived economic loss by training practice 
  Training practice 
Perceives econ loss  High  Med  Low 
Yes  5  1  4 
No  5  4  15 
Nor is it the case that employers’ perceptions of the financial costs and risks of training align 
with the observable intensity of their training practices. In all, ten employers reported that they 
experienced a period of economic loss while training a junior worker.  Of these, five were high,  
 
17 
and four were low-intensity workplace trainers. Moreover, it appears that at least some 
employers can provide high-intensity training without financial loss. Of the ten employers with 
the most intense training practices, half reported a period where training costs exceeded 
productivity, while half did not.  
 
Employer interviews – case descriptions 
The following section presents a thematic discussion  of  the interview findings. The 
workplaces are first categorized broadly as representing high or low investors in workplace 
training, and each group is broken into further subgroups based on apparent differences in 
training behaviour and business strategy. The classification is inevitably imprecise: workplaces 
will differ in some respects from others in the same group, just as they will share features with 
workplaces in other groups.  
 
GROUP H  HIGH INVESTORS 
Ten of the 33 workplaces are classified as high-intensity training investors. As 
shown earlier in Tables 3 and 4, these workplaces score highly on all three of the summary 
indicators of training intensity. They demonstrate high training capacity, in that they 
perform the full scope of their respective trades and employ certified trades workers who 
are expected to mentor apprentices in the workplace. In most cases, the 
employers/supervisors themselves are certified tradespersons, and all are familiar with 
the curriculum that their apprentices will follow during in-class technical training.  
They  score high on training “ethos” by expressing high regard for trades skills and 
certification, and usually a strong sense of vocational identity or “trade pride”. They explicitly 
assume a responsibility for training apprentices, whether in the specific interests of their own 
firm or as a broader contribution to their industry or trade. They demonstrate their commitment 
to training as a long-term investment strategy by retaining their trainees once they have achieved 
certification. Integrating the ideas of occupational identity and lifelong learning, several 
employers in this group described journeyperson certification as “only the beginning” of a 
learning process which, ideally, continues throughout a tradesperson’s career.  
Finally, these employers demonstrate all or most of the practices regarded here as 
indicators of intense training practice. In general, they are distinguished by attending explicitly to 
apprentices’ role as learners, (Fuller and Unwin, 2003) though this does not necessarily imply 
reduced expectations of productivity. Concretely, they ensure that apprentices are always or 
nearly always overseen by certified journeypersons, and they maintain apprentice-journeyperson 
ratios of no more than 1:1. They make an effort to expose trainees to the full scope of the trade, 
often by systematically rotating them through various departments and/or assigning them to 
diverse tasks or projects involving different procedures, problems, and skills. Typically, they 
align this progressive trades experience with at least the broad outlines of the in-school training 
curriculum in a conscious effort to enrich and reinforce the learning process. In some cases, this 
integration of workplace and institution-based learning is formalized in written training plans  
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that are monitored and reviewed by the supervisor or a designated apprenticeship coordinator 
within the organization. Not uncommonly in these training-intensive organizations, apprentices 
are rewarded for high achievement at technical training – and in some cases may be penalized or 
terminated for poor in-school performance.  
H1   High-value operations 
The seven firms in group H1 are private-sector employers, representing the automotive 
and construction sectors about equally. General contractor #01 specializes in one-of-a-kind 
construction and renovation projects in commercial, institutional, heritage, and up-scale 
residential markets. He has a steady workforce of 10 carpenters, including two apprentices at 
present. Flooring contractor #02 operates in the institutional and commercial sector.  His roughly 
45 unionized floor covering mechanics install carpet and other floor covering materials in large 
projects such as hospitals and office buildings. Electrical contractors #03 and #04 have fairly 
diverse and complex portfolios, covering a wide range of service work as well as new 
construction, primarily in commercial and industrial projects. Auto dealerships #05 and #06 
specialize respectively in Asian and European imports and employ  automotive service 
technicians in their service departments. Employer #07 is a truck and diesel engine rebuild shop 
and an authorized service centre for several brands of heavy equipment including marine and 
stationary diesel engines. 
Employers in this group are quite selective in their apprentice hiring. All have some form 
of probationary process, and five make pre-apprentice training (typically 6 to 10 months of full-
time study at a local vocational institute) a prerequisite for entry-level employees. One of the 
electrical contractors explained that workers with pre-app training need far less “hand holding” 
than those without and also have a more realistic understanding of the trade and a firmer 
commitment to pursuing it. Both auto dealerships and the diesel rebuild shop require a 
combination of preparatory training and probation. Junior employees – preferably recent high 
school grads with recommendations from their automotive shop teachers – start out as “lot boys” 
or, in the case of the diesel shop, shop maintenance workers. Those who have not completed a 
pre-app  program must do so before being considered for apprenticeship. New hires for the 
flooring contractor do not require advance training, but entry is tightly controlled nevertheless by 
a word-of-mouth vetting system that depends largely on social network and family connections 
among members of the flooring union. Candidates are hired as material handlers for a probation 
period of at most one month.  
The general approach to apprentice training throughout group H1 is direct workplace 
immersion. Apprentices are assigned to work with a journeyperson, or in the case of the 
construction and flooring contractors, possibly a small crew. Junior apprentices work initially as 
helpers, a role that frequently includes relatively unskilled work of material handling, “prep” 
work, and clean-up. In all cases, however, apprentices are regarded first and foremost as 
employees – expected to be productive from the outset, but also to be gaining proficiency at 
progressively higher-value tasks.  
This expectation is fundamental to the apprentice pay scale, which, in broad terms, was 
similar in all of the workplaces in this study (unionized or not) where apprentices were 
employed.  The details differ slightly according to employers’ preferences and collective 
agreement provisions, but the general pattern is a starting rate of 50 or 55% of the journeyperson 
wage followed by regular increases over the apprenticeship period. The increments may be based  
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on time (e.g. 5% every 6 months) and/or triggered by the apprentice’s completion of a level of 
in-class technical training. Whatever the specifics, a generally escalating wage scale is arguably 
the most concrete and consequential implication of an employer’s agreement to indenture an 
apprentice. And in broad terms, the ways in which employers respond to the apprentice wage 
scale is the difference between high and low- intensity workplace trainers.  
The Group H employers are unanimous in viewing their apprentices’ continued skill 
development as an economic imperative. While all ten of these employers fully anticipate long-
term payoffs from their investments (reflected in their intention to retain their apprentices after 
certification), they do not view the training period as a time of sunk costs whose repayment must 
be deferred to a distant and risky future. On the contrary, they describe the function of 
management – both at the operational level of the shop foreman or supervising journeyman and 
at the planning and budgeting stage – as fundamentally a matter of balancing the cost of labour 
against the value of production, over both the immediate and the longer terms.  
For the private-sector employers in group H1, the general strategy is to ensure that the 
value of apprentices’ output rises at least as quickly as their wages. Since the sheer volume of 
output stops rising as the apprentice reaches top efficiency on a given task, the potential for 
sustainable growth lies in raising the unit value of the product by increasing its skill content. In 
general, the H1 employers express very little concern over economic risk posed by employing 
apprentices. In the short term, risk is minimized by ensuring that trainees are assigned to work 
that they can profitably perform. Careful selection and the requirement of pre-apprentice training 
are ways of ensuring that even first-term apprentices are optimally productive. The typical 
practice of assigning junior apprentices to “helper” roles is a means of simultaneously extracting 
a degree of immediate productivity (commensurate with their wages) and of preparing them for 
higher-value and more independent work.  
In practice, the line between workplace supervising and “training” is not easy to see, and 
may differ depending on the workplace. Although the constant presence of a journeyperson is 
one of the criteria used here for high-intensity workplace training, employers in group H1 do not 
generally view the mentor role as a significant drag on senior workers’ productivity. Indeed, 
several employers noted that their journeypersons themselves would not tolerate an apprentice 
who substantially slowed their production, again signaling the apprentice’s primary role as an 
employee. Even in these training-intensive workplaces, the mentor-learner relationship is not 
seen as one that conflicts with or displaces productivity, but is rather integrated with it. These 
employers’ descriptions of workplace practice depict a balance between producing and learning 
that evolves over the course of an apprenticeship. Throughout the process, apprentices will 
alternate among learn-work situations, at some times helping a journeyperson to perform a task 
(especially one that requires four hands), at others receiving direction and instruction on what to 
do and how to do it, but largely working independently under the direction of a senior worker 
who is present but not directly involved. All three types of situation occur throughout the training 
period, although the proportion – and more importantly the value – of the independent work rises 
over time. The apprentice mechanics at the two auto dealers and the diesel shop spend their first 
several months attached to a senior mechanic before being assigned their own service bays. 
There, they initially work on tasks delegated by the journeyperson, but as their skills develop 
they are assigned work orders in their own names, and call on the senior worker only as needed. 
As they return from successive levels of in-school technical training, they are assigned  
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increasingly advanced tasks. A similar pattern applies to the electricians, flooring mechanics, and 
carpenters in the other workplaces in group H1.  
This close integration of work and learning makes it difficult for employers to quantify 
the indirect costs of workplace training arising from trainees’ inefficiency and mentors’ reduced 
productivity. When pressed, interviewees in group H1 gave varying estimates (see Appendix B) 
but two broad assessments were consistent. In the first place, their estimates of specific training 
costs were quite low (e.g. “unproductive learning” time of 0 to 10%; mentor productivity 
reduced by at most 25% for a short period). More significant was the consensus that, over all, 
employing apprentices does not impose net costs or deterrent risks. On the contrary, all of the 
high-intensity employers explicitly regard apprenticeship as an economically rational business 
strategy.  
In managing the economics of apprenticeship, these employers not only use the shop-
floor management practices described above, but also capitalize on the apprentice wage scale. 
For the repair shop employers, apprentices’ profitability is based not only in their own 
comparatively low wages, but also in the fact that they can be assigned to relatively low-value 
mechanical tasks, freeing the senior workers for higher-value work. In the words of auto dealer 
#05, “… there’s no doubt, they do make you money”. For the construction firms, which typically 
operate on stipulated-price contracts, the apprentice wage scale offers a margin of profit. The 
following descriptions of the bidding process were  echoed by several other construction 
employers:  
When we bid a job, we look at what can be done with apprentices and 
what can be done with journeymen, and we basically blend our costs to 
facilitate the use of apprentices.… But, does it actually cost us to use 
apprentices? I would say in the majority of times, no. Because you allow for 
this in how you approach the job. (Employer #03) 
Typically, you don't make a lot of money on the labour; you make 
money on the job as a whole. So, having an apprentice is supposed to benefit 
the job, because you've got someone who's making half as much, but you've 
bid the job on the basis of two journeymen. And hopefully you can bring it in 
as fast as if you had two journeymen. (Employer #02) 
 
H2:  Regulated utilities 
The workplaces in Group H2 also qualify as high investors in workplace training, but 
operate in a quite different business environment from those in H1. Contractor #08 employs 
powerline technicians to construct new overhead and underground lines on private property such 
as industrial sites and new subdivisions, and to perform maintenance and emergency repair 
services under contract to the provincial hydro authority. Employers #09 and #10 are both 
public-sector machinery repair facilities: a municipal equipment depot and a maintenance garage 
for a public transit system. Heavy duty and commercial transport mechanics in the transit garage 
work solely on the regional bus fleet, while those in the municipal depot repair a wide array of 
machinery and vehicles ranging from chain saws through police cruisers, garbage compactors, 
and earth movers.   
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In terms of their training behaviour, the three employers in this group are distinguished 
by their intensive candidate selection processes, their high levels of direct and indirect 
investment in skill development, and the long tenure of their trades employees.  All three 
employers use formal screening and probation processes to select candidates for apprentice 
positions. Entry-level workers at the powerline company are hired as “trades helpers” for a 6-
month  probationary period, after which successful candidates are sent to a training and 
assessment program (“boot camp”) to determine their suitability for apprenticeship and to 
receive formal safety training before commencing their trainee role. Both repair depots require 
entry-level applicants for mechanical positions to have completed a pre-apprenticeship program. 
Both also have formal occupational structures that clearly differentiate skilled (apprenticeable) 
from semi-skilled mechanical positions. New hires serve 18 to 24 months in an “automotive 
service worker” position for before becoming eligible for an apprenticeship. At the transit 
garage, junior workers deemed to lack apprenticeship potential may be retained permanently as 
“utility workers”, who perform semi-skilled mechanical work such as oil changes and engine 
steam cleaning. The intensive screening processes and occupational hierarchies help to ensure 
that permanent trades workers have the capacity and the work assignments that will enable them 
to concentrate on high-value activities. As a manager from the municipal depot explained:  
We guard the front door pretty carefully. And then when we hire people we 
promote them and move them through…. We don’t want to see people make a 
career of sweeping the shop floor or pumping gas. 
The functional division of labour also highlights the apprentice’s status as a trainee or 
learner who is being prepared for a specialized, technically intensive role. Strict  safety 
regulations at the powerline company mean that apprentices are closely supervised and 
prohibited from certain kinds of work until they have received formal training. In tandem with 
their progression through in-school training, they are assigned to increasingly advanced work 
roles on the crew. In the two maintenance facilities, apprentice mechanics are systematically 
circulated through all departments or work areas. Managers explained that their aim is both to 
give trainees a global awareness of the organizations’ business and to build sufficient breadth of 
skill that workers can be re-assigned within the shops as necessary. The manager of the transit 
garage confided that another benefit of circulating apprentices through the facility is as a means 
of injecting enthusiasm and up-to-date technological skills into work units where older, 
incumbent workers may be less up to date.  
The argument that employers may be deterred from apprenticeship  by the risk of 
“poaching” supposes that the costs of training exceed the net value of apprentices’ productivity. 
On the one hand, all three of the employers in this group report high direct and indirect costs 
related to training apprentices. The two public-sector workplaces pay apprentices their full wages 
during their annual in-school training, and the transit garage provides accommodation and living 
allowances in cases where apprentices must attend training out of town. All three employers are 
conscious that, while apprentices spend most of their workplace time on productive activity, they 
may be inefficient on unfamiliar tasks, and they require effort from the mentoring journeyperson. 
Managers at municipal garage #09 estimate that, even accounting for the apprentice’s 
contribution as a helper, a journeyperson supervising a first-year apprentice will be 20% to 25% 
less productive than if working alone. The most extreme case is the transit garage, where the 
supervisor estimates that …  
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… in the first year you basically have 2 FTE’s of cost, and less than one FTE 
of productivity. 
On the other hand, none of the respondents expressed much concern about either the 
absolute cost of training or the risk of losing their training investments through attrition. In part, 
this reflects these employers’ confidence that their skilled workers will remain with them, 
attracted by very competitive wages, job security, and working conditions. Ninety percent of 
heavy duty mechanics at transit garage #10 remain until retirement age. Some older powerline 
technicians at #08 may leave the company for less physically demanding work (often with the 
provincial hydro authority), but over half of its certified workers have ten or more years’ 
seniority with the organization. It is also likely that their position in the utilities sector enables 
these workplaces to absorb training costs that would put others at a competitive disadvantage. As 
the supervisor for the powerline contractor observed:  
I’m sure the company isn’t losing. We know we have to train and we 
have to maintain our safety standards. And not just for apprentices: the 
tailgate meetings and safety upgrading are for the whole crew, journeymen 
included. But this is the nature of the industry. Every other outfit in the 
business has to do the same things. 
 
A public sector contrarian 
Employer #11 is an interesting departure from the public-sector employers of Group H2. 
This facilities maintenance department for a large school district employs approximately 50 
certified journeypersons in at least nine Red Seal trades. As the unit performs some new 
construction work in addition to maintenance, its scope of activity as well as its complement of 
certified workers would seem to constitute a substantial capacity for apprentice training. 
Furthermore, the interviewee (a senior manager and certified tradesperson) expressed the 
commitments to certification, training, and trades employment that qualify here as a strong 
training ethos. 
Despite this apparent capacity, however, employer #11 cannot be considered a high 
investor in workplace training for the simple reason that it systematically avoids hiring 
apprentices. The employer’s explanation is that the labour relations environment militates against 
apprenticeship training. School district employees belong to a public-sector union whose 
membership is not defined on craft lines but covers a broad spectrum of hourly employees 
including tradespersons, custodians, and clerical workers. Because job opportunities are 
allocated on the basis of seniority, any vacancy for a trades apprenticeship would be open first to 
long-term incumbents. Despite the employer’s enthusiasm in principle for the apprenticeship 
model, his view is that candidates acceptable to the union would not likely have the attributes 
(including youth) desirable in an apprentice. As a result the school district renews its trades 
labour force exclusively through external hiring of certified journeypersons.   
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GROUP L  LOW INVESTORS 
The employers included in Group L generally score substantially lower on training 
intensity, capacity, and ethos than those in Group H. As above, the employers in this category are 
placed in subgroups according to additional commonalities. Those in group L1 are small-scale 
entrepreneurs, usually certified tradespersons themselves, with varying capacity for and sporadic 
involvement in apprentice training. The generally larger employers in group L2 engage 
systematically with the apprenticeship system, employing relatively large numbers of 
apprentices. But they do so primarily as a wage strategy rather than from a commitment to skill 
development. Those in L3, by contrast, are less systematic in their dependence on the 
apprenticeship system and in fact indifferent to the occupational boundaries that apprenticeship 
conventionally relies on. Group L4 represents another interesting anomaly within the trades-
employing labour market: that of workplaces organized on piecework. Finally, group L5 consists 
of employers whose training capacity is so weak as to effectively exclude them from 
participation in apprenticeship.  
L1   Independent artisans   
The six employers in group L1 are small, independent firms owned by certified 
tradesmen who remain closely involved in day to day operations. With the help of one other 
certified carpenter, contractor #12 builds one or two houses per year, either “on spec” or 
customized for a specific client. The five mechanical repair shops are also small operations, 
providing basic repair services, largely to repeat customers. Four provide various combinations 
of retail automotive repair services, while the last shop in the list specializes in heavy truck and 
commercial vehicle repair. In four cases, the owners’ wives handle the bookkeeping on a part-
time basis.  
This pattern of personal relationships also characterizes their approach to apprentice 
training. Only three of the employers have apprentices at present, although all five have trained 
at some time in the past. When asked their rationales for indenturing apprentices, three said that 
the main impetus had usually been the trainee’s own insistence. Otherwise, their general 
objective in apprenticing has been to cultivate an employee whose skills – both technical and 
social – will be compatible with the enterprise and its customers. Accordingly, apprentices are 
often hired through the entrepreneurs’ own social networks: personal friends, fellow church or 
service club members, and family.  
On the economics of apprenticeship, these employers’ views again reflect their rather 
organic, artisanal approach to business. All of them regard their apprentices as productive 
workers and estimate the amount of “unproductive learning” time during an apprenticeship at 
very near zero (the high estimates were 2%). Although the entrepreneurs and/or their certified 
employees necessarily spend some time guiding and directing apprentices in the workplace, none 
of the respondents saw this as a drain on productivity worth estimating. Apart from the usual 
wage progression, none have formal policies on financial support for apprentices. None pay 
apprentices’ wages during technical training, though three had provided various forms of  ad hoc 
financial assistance (e.g. partial tuition payment; wages during EI waiting period) in hardship 
cases.  
To some extent, these employers’ reliance on social networks, and their preference to 
“grow their own” workers through apprenticeship, reflect a broad distrust of trade certification  
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that was apparent throughout this study. On the one hand, all six employers in this group value 
and respect craft skill, and all are proud to be certified tradesmen themselves. But when it comes 
to hiring others, they share a skepticism of trade certificates as reliable indicators of competency. 
As truck repair shop owner #17 put it, “[a trade qualification] is like a driver’s license: some 
people shouldn’t have one.” His particular concern was with certified heavy duty mechanics 
whose experience is confined to logging or mining operations, and who are unprepared for the 
wide range of vehicles and mechanical problems that his shop encounters. But his general doubt 
is shared by the other automotive shops in this group, which service all makes of car, and by 
builder #12, who chooses to perform all of the carpentry work on his homes, from foundation 
through finishing. While these employers generally view the trade certificate as evidence of 
valuable in-school technical training, they have no such confidence in its value as a rigorous 
mark of the workplace-based learning that they also consider essential.  
L2   High-volume construction 
All seven employers in Group L2 are in the construction sector. Although all employ 
relatively large numbers of apprentices, they do not manifest most of the workplace practices, 
nor necessarily reflect the capacity or ethos, that would qualify them here as intensive training 
investors. 
Employer #2 is a building contractor who, at the time of the interview, was overseeing a 
large tract housing project and the construction of pre-fabricated wood-frame homes. Painting 
contractor #23 and electrical contractor #24 also work in the wood-frame residential market. 
However, as evidence that low-intensity training practices are not confined to the wood-frame 
sector, general contractors #3, and #4, and wall and ceiling contractor #21 operate in the ICI 
(institutional, commercial, and industrial) segment of the construction industry. Mechanical 
contractor #22 specializes in plumbing and sprinkler fitting for highrise residential buildings. 
The high ratios of apprentices to journeypersons in this group of workplaces reflect 
quasi-industrial production processes that depend on large inputs of routine manual labour and 
relatively smaller inputs of planning and problem-solving at the point of production. Typically, 
work crews consist mainly of apprentices and labourers, directed by a foreman or lead hand who 
may (or may not) be certified. Supervisors are not generally expected to provide training, except 
to the extent that guidance and instruction may help them achieve their main objective: i.e. 
optimizing the productivity and cost efficiency of a mixed-ability crew.  
In this context, the significance of apprenticeship is not so much as a framework for skill 
development as for the rational division of labour and wage costs. To some extent, this was the 
case for all of the employers interviewed here, as reflected by the following comment from the 
“high-investing” electrical contractor #03:  
For instance, if all the conduit is in, and all we need is to pull the wire, 
then that’s a junior job, essentially a labouring job, where you’d use first or 
second term apprentices. On another job, maybe you’d plan to use fifth or 
sixth term apprentices. 
The low investors of the present group are distinguished, however, by their almost 
exclusive attention to the wage-setting rather than the skill-formation implications of 
apprenticeship. Whereas the high-investing employers strove to align their apprentices’ rising  
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wages against progressively higher-value outputs, employers in the present group are unable to 
do this because the bulk of their labour costs are spent on relatively low-value work. The rational 
business strategy here is not to invest in capacity for high-skill production, but rather to optimize 
wage and skill levels within the company’s market niche.  
For electrical contractor #24, this means maintaining a labour force mainly of junior 
apprentices: the foreman who was interviewed was himself a 3
rd year apprentice, overseeing a 
crew of more junior apprentices on a large house wiring project, and reporting weekly to an off-
site field safety representative. Mechanical contractor #22 organizes his trades workers for high-
efficiency production within narrowly defined roles. Because each floor of a residential highrise 
is identical to the one below, foremen assign plumbers to repeat the same subassemblies on every 
floor of the building. As a result, an apprentice plumber may work for months or even years but 
experience only a fraction of the materials and practices used in the trade. Asked his rationale for 
participating in the apprenticeship system, the employer was succinct:  
Well, it’s not my gift to humanity, lets’ put it that way. The simple fact 
is that it’s the only way I can get two man-days of production out of one-and-
a-half man-days of wages. It’s not pretty, but unfortunately it’s a fact of 
business in [the highrise residential] sector.  
Consistent with their limited skill requirements, employers in this group are uniformly 
unimpressed by full trade certification. Mechanical contractor #22 is obliged to hire through the 
union dispatcher, but discards certified plumbers –  even broadly skilled ones –  who are 
inexperienced in the specifics of highrise construction.  Residential painting contractor #23 
openly concedes that journeyperson certification is not an asset that his company expects when 
hiring, and would imply an excessive level of skill. Illustrating the intersection of the wage and 
output curves, contractor #20 explained that his firm does not always find it economical to re-
hire apprentices who have been released to attend in-school technical training, or necessarily to 
grant raises to those who attain certification.  
L3   Craft skeptics 
As general contractors in the ICI sector, the two employers in group L3 are broadly 
similar to #19 and #20, described in the previous section. The difference is not that they are 
necessarily higher-intensity workplace trainers. Rather, their smaller numbers of apprentices, and 
their correspondingly lower apprentice-journeyperson ratios, reflect their “flexible” view of 
occupational titles. Unlike the high-intensity workplaces in group H1, which carefully segregate 
low-skilled support positions from high-skilled “trades”, these employers minimize job-title 
hierarchies and use a broad continuum of “construction worker” roles in which labourer, 
carpenter, and project superintendent are intermingled. Both firms employ apprentices, 
sometimes indenturing capable labourers who wish to acquire in-school training, and sometimes 
hiring apprentices who have begun their programs elsewhere. But the companies’ investments in 
training – both institutional and workplace-based– are neither premised on conventional titles nor 
imply any commitment to trade certification. Rather, the career ladder here leads to a core group 
of long-term project management positions, gradually replenished from a broad base of 
temporary project labour. Training is provided as and where necessary, but it is primarily 
targeted to “up and coming” workers regarded as having management potential. To this end, a 
carpentry apprenticeship –  or parts of it –  may be a valuable training investment, but not  
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necessarily more so than a college course in construction technology or commerce, and certainly 
not because trade certification is valued in its own right. 
L4   Flat rate shops 
The three automotive employers in Group L4 have been classified separately on the basis 
of their common business model. These employers are a North American automotive dealership, 
a combination auto-service centre/department store, and a network of franchised collision repair 
centres. Unlike the construction contractors and automotive dealerships discussed above, who 
generally charge their clients a fixed price for the completion of a project and pay their 
employees an hourly wage, the employers in this group use a “flat rate” system. Under the 
system, every repair service offered by the shop is assigned a pre-determined amount of labour 
time. Regardless of the time the repair actually takes to perform, this figure becomes the basis for 
calculating the customer’s invoice and the tradesperson’s earnings. 
The system seems to have interesting implications both for workplace training practice 
and for employers’ perceptions of the costs of apprenticeship. In the first place, all three of the 
employers in this group volunteered that the model tends inherently to suppress training effort, 
because of the incentives that it creates for journeypersons. (This point was repeated by the other 
two auto dealers, who operate on the alternative, “straight time” system.) Although technicians in 
flat-rate shops are formally employees they also have a quasi-entrepreneurial status, plying their 
trade within the employer’s premises but substantially determining their own earnings by their 
productivity. One service manager described his role as a “broker” for the certified technicians in 
his facility. Experienced technicians are able to earn substantially more than their nominal hourly 
wages by completing work tasks in less time than the flat rate schedule specifies. By the same 
token, anything that would impede output –  including time spent training an apprentice – 
constitutes an opportunity cost to the journeyperson. In recognition of this deterrent effect, one 
body shop employer had introduced a formula that would give the journeyperson a share of the 
apprentice’s billable output, but neither the journeypersons in the shop nor the owner were 
completely comfortable with it.   
The flat-rate employers also shared a particular outlook on the economics of apprentice 
training. Under BC labour law, apprentices are paid an hourly, rather than a flat rate. On the one 
hand, junior apprentices are a source of low-cost labour that can contribute to the shop’s overall 
productivity by handling low-value tasks (prep work in the body shops; lubes and tire work in 
the auto service centres) and non-billable duties such as shop clean-up. However, it also means 
that apprentices must be paid for eight hours of work regardless of the shop’s volume of business 
on a given day. It was this mismatch between fixed labour costs and variable revenue that led 
several of the flat-rate employers to conclude that they “lost” money on apprentices, since not 
every hour of wage costs could be aligned with an hour of revenue. Meanwhile, other employers 
observed, first, that the perceived losses disappear when they are amortized over a longer period, 
and secondly that they have nothing to do with training; rather, they are a fact of life in retail 
commerce, and no more peculiar to apprentices than to any other hourly-paid employee.  
L5   Non-participants 
The workplaces in group L5 employ workers in “trades” occupations, but participate 
minimally or not at all in apprentice training. They operate relatively low-skill operations and 
neither perceive a need for certified workers nor have the capacity to train at the apprentice level.  
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Employer #30 runs a two-man foundation-forming and house-framing business in the 
single-family residential sector. Although he refers to both himself and his current employee as 
carpenters, neither has formal training in the trade. The owner has two years of college education 
in business, as well as former work experience as a travel agent and a construction labourer. 
Employer #31 has operated as an exterior siding contractor, also in the single-family residential 
market, for three years. During his time in business he has employed a total of 10 to 12 workers 
and currently employs two fully skilled siding installers and two labourers. Again, no one in the 
company holds trade certification. Brake and muffler franchise #33 is another example, in this 
case from the automotive sector, of a workplace on the margins of the apprenticeship system. 
The shop owner is not a certified tradesperson, and for census purposes the workers here would 
normally be classified as “automotive mechanical installers and servicers (NOC-S H533), not an 
apprenticeable trade. Nonetheless, the shop has employed a small number of apprentices over the 
years, normally at times when it had a certified auto mechanic on staff, although no apprentice 
ever stayed through to completion. Its very limited role in the apprenticeship system has more 
often been as an entry point, allowing inexperienced workers to log enough hours in the 
automotive sector to apply for employment in shops with higher wages and a prospect of formal 
certification. 
Despite their weak training capacity and their minimal contact with the apprenticeship 
system, the employers in this lower echelon express some of the greatest concern about the costs 
of training. Though these accounts are not always coherent, their relevance lies both in the 
insights that they provide into these employers’ practices and perceptions and in their similarity 
to some of the estimates cited in the CAF (2006) study of employers’ training costs. 
Forming/framing contractor #30 estimates that a “carpenter” trainee can attain basic 
competence in about 18 months. About 5% of the wage costs for this time will be lost to learning 
that has no direct production value. The more significant training cost, however, is that the 
mentor’s (i.e. owner’s) own productivity declines by as much as 80% for the first half of this 
period due to the effort of training. Over all, this employer estimates the output value of a trainee 
worker at 50% of the wage cost for the first year. This diseconomy is unavoidable, however, for 
the simple reason that employees cannot be found who will work for their actual value. Siding 
contractor #31 estimates that a new hire can become fully competent with 18 to 24 months of 
workplace experience. Differing from #30, he believes that trainee/helpers do not reduce but 
rather enhance the senior worker’s productivity. Nonetheless, he estimates that new trainees 
produce only 70% of their wage cost for the first couple of months.  
Brake and muffler operator #33 estimates that a trainee (whether a registered apprentice 
or not) can reduce the supervisors’ own productivity by 40% for a period of one to two years, as 
well as costing the shop $400 to $500 a month in wasted materials and production delays. 
Surprisingly, the employer concludes that the overall impact is neutral, and that he does not 
actually “lose money” on trainees except when the shop is very busy (the opposite of the retailers 
above who reported that they lost when business was slow). On further probing, he explained 
that the “loss” he had in mind was the opportunity cost where potential customers are turned 
away because the shop is fully booked. Here again, an employer seems to characterize a business 
irritant – in this case, a peak-time skill shortage – as a cost of training.    
The last workplace in this section revisits the issue of flat-rate compensation and its effect 
on training investment. Employer #32 operates a retail floor coverings centre and maintains a  
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roster of five two-man crews – an installer and a helper – to install carpet and other flooring 
products in customers’ homes. For census purposes these workers would be classified, like the 
unionized employees of high-intensity workplace #02 above, as floor covering installers (NOC-S 
H145). However, whereas #02 is a closed-shop union firm catering to corporate and institutional 
clients, #32 operates in a highly competitive retail flooring market with a much narrower range 
of products and dramatically smaller-scale projects.  
Despite his high regard for certification and formal training and his own history as a 
certified flooring mechanic, the shop owner finds himself in a market environment where 
training is not a rational investment, either for himself or for his workers:  
With these five guys that I have, nobody really wants to take on an 
apprentice. And you can't really blame them. They get paid by the square foot, 
so if he takes on an apprentice and pays him, at the beginning he pays him, 
say $15 an hour. But as the guy gets better he'll want more and more money. 
And sooner or later, he makes just as much as the installer does, and yet [the 
team] can only produce so many square feet per day. So, in time, the installer 
will let him go.  
Of course, the helpers aren't stupid either. They look at a job and can 
see that the installer is going to get $600 for it. So they say, 'why am I getting 
100, and he's getting 500, and I'm doing half the work or more?'  At this point, 
they tend to become installers themselves. It’s a major, major, major problem 
for training.  
Apprenticeship incentives 
As a stimulus to apprenticeship registration and completion, the federal government 
offers financial initiatives to employers and apprentices: an apprenticeship job creation tax credit 
(AJTC), and two apprenticeship incentive and completion grants (AIG and ACG). Interviewees 
were asked three questions about these incentives: (a) whether they were aware of the incentive; 
(b) whether they had applied for the tax credit, and where applicable whether their apprentices 
had applied for the grant(s); and (c) whether the incentive had influenced their decision or – for 
those who had been unaware of it – whether it would have influenced their decision if they had 
known of it.  
Table 10   Incentives 
Employer tax credit   
Aware  20 
Rec’d  9 
Influenced   0 




Aware  19 
Rec’d  12 
Influenced  1 




Approximately two-thirds of respondents had prior awareness of each of the incentives. 
Nine employers had received the tax credit, and 12 were aware of apprentices who had received 
the AIG. Predictably, recipients were content with what they referred to as “a nice bonus” and 
“free money” (and two employers who had been unaware indicated that they would certainly 
apply for it). On the question of influence, however, they were unanimous and often emphatic. 
The response of this contractor was typical:  
No. There’s no way we’d let a couple thousand dollars affect our HR 
practices. No way. 
Although one contractor thought it plausible that the AIG could affect an apprentice’s 
decision to continue, all of the others who were asked disagreed. The two apprentices who were 
asked indicated, similarly, that they welcomed the bonus but would certainly have completed 
their program without it.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The above findings address three of the four claims presented in the introduction as 
implicit premises of current apprenticeship policies. In response to the first, the review of census 
data in section 1 demonstrates that apprenticeship is not the principal source of labour for 
“skilled trades” occupations. On average, under 40% of workers in the occupations categorized 
by the NOC as trades hold trade certification, and under 25% have successfully completed an 
apprenticeship.  Dramatic differences of the educational profiles of group-H occupations suggest 
that the labour market’s demand for apprenticeship credentials is far from uniform. The declining 
prevalence of certification across Table 1, and the progressively greater openness to uncertified 
workers, suggests a hierarchy among trades occupations in terms of their skill requirements and 
the consequent rationality – for either workers or employers – of investments in apprenticeship 
training. The census analysis casts doubt on a prevailing policy regime that has presupposed high 
and uniform demand for skill across “trades” occupations while attributing low participation and 
completion rates to supply-side barriers.  
Two specific premises of the “barriers” thesis  were explored through the employer 
interviews: that the apprenticeship process is inherently costly and risky for employers, and that, 
in the absence of offsetting compensation, these risks would deter investment  in workplace 
training. Minimally, the interviews challenge these assumptions by providing some provocative 
counterexamples – for instance, of employers who provide little or no workplace training, or who 
claim that their training decisions are unaffected by either the fear of “poaching” or the lure of 
tax incentives. The interviewed employers also displayed a generally keen awareness of the cost-
benefit implications of apprenticeship for their own operations. Within their particular contexts, 
participating employers had evidently found ways of managing the costs and risks of workplace 
training, generally, through a combination of workplace task assignment and employee retention 
decisions. The employers with the highest direct and indirect training costs expressed little or no 
fear of poaching and were confident that the working conditions and other benefits they provide 
would enable them to develop and retain high-quality, long-term employees. Those with less 
intensive workplace training practices were similarly unconcerned with the risk of lost training  
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investments, partly because of their lower inputs, but mainly because their business models 
depend on higher ratios of lower-skilled and often temporary production workers. Ironically, 
some of the most acute concerns over the cost of training were expressed by employers who do 
not employ workers in apprenticeable occupations. Further investigation will be needed in order 
to ascertain just how representative these cases are.  In the meantime, the interview findings 
suggest that employers’ reasons for and ways of engaging with the apprenticeship system are far 
from uniform.  
To a certain extent these differences are consistent with the view of apprenticeship as a 
counterpart of “craft” as opposed to “industrial” production. In an ideal model of craft work, the 
individual artisan creates a product or performs a service from start to finish, exercising control 
over its conception, planning, and execution. In a similarly idealized model of industrial 
production, the line  worker applies strictly procedural skill to a designated step within a 
production process that is planned, coordinated, and quality-controlled by others. The craft and 
industrial models are arguably represented to greater or lesser degrees among the workplaces 
described here, and in their utilization of apprentices. At several of the construction sites, crews 
consisting mainly of junior workers  perform routinized, high-volume framing, wiring, and 
plumbing tasks that are coordinated and authorized by specialists who may seldom be present. At 
others, apprentices are in a minority, assigned to assist and learn from certified tradespersons 
who have key responsibility for jobs that require considerable planning and problem solving. In 
one group of automotive shops, highly trained technicians working in well-equipped 
maintenance facilities rebuild entire mechanical systems and fabricate special-purpose 
machinery. In others, mechanics and uncertified workers replace standard components, while 
bench tasks such as electrical or transmission repairs are “subbed out” to specialty 
subcontractors.  
However, the employer interviews (as well as international comparisons) also indicate 
that high-quality apprenticeship training can occur in industrial environments, just as artisans’ 
shops can be very poor sites for learning. In jurisdictions where the apprenticeship model has 
succeeded, it has been accompanied by a variety of institutional supports that have also sustained 
the viability of intensive workplace training. Some have served to sustain producer monopolies 
that restrict  the  labour  supply  and keep wages high enough to cover the costs of skill 
development. Others have sustained the demand for complex skill, for instance by regulating 
quality standards. The employer interviews reveal great variation in employment and workplace 
training practices, and in the organizations’ operating environments. Stark differences in the 
capacity to utilize and develop skill are illustrated, for instance, by contrasts between flooring 
companies #02 and #32, between the transit garage and the “bottom feeding” auto repair shops, 
and between the niche-market construction firms and the semi-skilled subcontractors.  
These differences in the firms’ internal capacities  appear to be  adapted to external 
business circumstances that affect demand. A clear commonality among the intense trainers is 
their aim to develop highly skilled practitioners who can work autonomously while producing 
high-value outputs. This worker profile reflects both the skill requirements of the production 
process and a business environment that makes high-skill production profitable. An example of 
the former is the electricians at high-intensity firms #03 and #04, who must be able to manage 
complex service calls independently.  Environmental factors common to the high-investing 
workplaces include market niche and regulatory environment. The high-intensity trainers often 
work in upscale markets, as do building contractor #01 and electrical contractor #03 who both  
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specialize in “odd ball” and complex projects; and the auto dealerships, whose clients are 
generally owners of new cars. In addition, the high-intensity workplaces all operate under 
regulatory constraints that demand high levels of craft skill while also mitigating the risk in 
training investments. The comments of the powerline contractor illustrate the market-leveling 
effect of strict safety regulations in that industry. Closed-shop unions may also help to equalize 
costs where entire sectors operate under the same collective agreements (e.g. 
industrial/commercial electrical work; flooring). Still, the examples of the highrise plumbing and 
drywall contractors also show that a closed-shop union per se  is no guarantee of training 
intensity if the union is unwilling or unable to enforce the regulations.  
Meanwhile, the examples of  non-union workplaces that provide high-quality training 
illustrate that demand for high skills can be induced not only by producer monopolies, but also 
by external forms of regulation. Although BC law does not directly require trade certification for 
any occupation, several of the employers here have chosen to offer services that are regulated in 
some form or other. The two public-sector equipment depots, the factory-authorized diesel shop, 
and the franchised auto service centres all require that their technicians hold trade certification, 
partly in order to qualify these workplaces to perform regulated services such as vehicle safety 
inspections. Certification and training may also be stipulated in the terms of private contract. In 
the case of the auto dealerships, technician certification and regular upgrading are mandated by 
the auto manufacturers as a condition on franchisees. For collision repair shops that perform 
work through the provincial auto insurance corporation, similar requirements apply. Even in the 
construction sector, corporate clients may insist that bidders use only certified workers for 
particular projects, or for the installation of warranted components such as institutional flooring 
materials. By contrast with all of these cases, the low-investing employers covered by the study 
operate in markets or niches with few or no regulatory incentives to train. By highlighting the 
apparent effects of  market niche and regulation on  the demand for skill, these examples 
challenge a key premise of current Canadian apprenticeship policies, which rely on extensive 
direct and indirect subsidies to participants as means of overcoming  supposed supply-side 
barriers.  
Apprenticeship institutions and stakeholder strategies 
Current apprenticeship policy presupposes, not only that all trades employers face similar 
barriers to training investment, but also that they respond similarly to public inputs, including the 
direct subsidies of recent years but also the institutional elements of apprenticeship such as in-
class technical training and apprentice registration and certification. Again, the interviews 
suggest that these public supports are not single-purpose remedies for widely prevalent sorts of 
market failure, but instead offer a variety of distinct resources that can be put to use within very 
different business strategies. The interviews reveal employer capitalizing in quite different ways 
on particular  institutional  facets  of apprenticeship  including  the  wage-setting  function,  the 
indentureship requirement, in-school training, and certification.  
All of the interviewees, whether bound by formal wage constraints or not, were clearly 
conscious of the wage implications of an indentureship agreement. Where they differed was in 
their responses. For high-intensity employers, the pressure of rising wages was a clear impetus to 
ensure that apprentices received the training and experience that would keep the value of their 
productivity rising faster than their costs. For the high-volume construction employers, by 
contrast, the wage scale provided a standard grid for hiring predominantly short-term workers at  
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optimal wage and skill levels for particular types of production work. Finally, for highly price-
sensitive employers in both the construction and automotive sectors, the prospect of fixed wage 
expectations was a reason to avoid apprenticeship commitments altogether or to dabble in the 
system only occasionally and at the lowest levels.  
Similarly, all of the employers with experience of apprenticeship expressed respect for 
the value  of in-school technical training, while again incorporating it into quite different 
strategies. While all of these employers recognized the productivity benefits of in-class training, 
and expanded the scope of their apprentices’ responsibilities with each level of training they 
completed, high-intensity employers were far more careful to promote learning by actively 
linking apprentices’ workplace tasks to the in-class curriculum. Low-intensity employers 
reflected their more limited portfolios and skill requirements by employing mainly second and 
third-year apprentices, and laying trainees off as both their skills and their wage entitlements rose 
beyond their optimal range.  
Employers’ differing approaches to workplace training have implications for the 
signaling value of trade certification. Their strong consensus on the value of technical training 
was matched by their caution as to the credibility of trade qualifications. As some of the 
employer comments above illustrated, this concern inevitably reflected an awareness, on the one 
hand, that apprentices may have had dramatically different kinds of workplace-based learning 
experiences, and on the other that provincially granted apprenticeship credentials are based 
entirely on in-class testing. Success on written tests was clearly important to some employers as 
a sign of worker’s literacy and information skills. But interviewees generally agreed that paper-
based certification is  an unreliable indicator of job candidates’  relevant  work  experience or 
practical skills.  This mistrust of trade certification leads some employers to avoid hiring 
journeypersons, others to place new trades workers on various kinds of probation, and others to 
hire through established social networks. From one viewpoint these responses  illustrate  the 
negative  market  consequences  of  unclear occupational standards, and  perhaps  the  case for 
reforming the evaluation and certification mechanisms in the skilled trades. On the other hand, a 
situation that may be inefficient for the labour market in the abstract may nonetheless have 
practical value at the local level, as in the case of employers who cite the unreliability of trades 
credentials as grounds for extracting wage concessions from new hires.  
The interviews reveal other instances where particular institutional elements of 
apprenticeship are evidently put to strategic uses not captured by the standard assumptions. In all 
Canadian jurisdictions, apprenticeship is set apart from other forms of post-secondary education 
by the indentureship mechanism: the unique requirement that both the trainee and the employer 
register with the provincial apprenticeship authority. The contemporary function of indentureship 
is not obvious. It is often portrayed as evidence of the continuity of modern apprenticeship with 
its ancient roots, as a training system fundamentally dependent on employer-led instruction in the 
workplace. In that light, the indentureship agreement would protect the trainee’s interest in fair 
compensation and effective workplace training, and the employer’s investment of training effort. 
Even in historical terms, this image is unrealistically well-balanced, since agreements were far 
more often enforced in favour of masters over runaway apprentices than by trainees over abusive 
employers.  In  present-day  Canada it is all the less plausible to construe apprenticeship 
registration  as a two-way contract between employer/trainer and worker/learner. In the first 
place, the agreement is not an enforceable contract, as it can be terminated  by either party 
without penalty. More importantly, any leverage that the contemporary agreement exerts is not  
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based in mutual obligations between employer and trainee, but rather arises from offering each 
party conditional access to public resources. Again, the benefits are rather lopsided. For the 
employer, the up side of the agreement is at least a basic assurance of an employee who is 
committed to spending several years in the occupation and eligible for high-quality, publicly 
subsidized in-school technical training. (However, as the interviews showed, employers differ in 
the value that they place on both of these). The down side is negligible: in British Columbia, a 
“sponsorship agreement” imposes no obligations whatsoever upon the employer, either with 
respect to training or compensation of apprentices. For both parties, the most reliable implication 
of the agreement is acceptance of a trainee wage scale (whether based in provincial legislation 
or, as in BC, in custom). The second is that only by registering a sponsorship agreement can the 
trainee be designated an “apprentice” and gain eligibility for in-class technical training. 
Together, these two elements give the modern indentureship agreement a coercive potential, 
effectively making the employer’s ongoing sponsorship (and the apprentice’s acceptance of the 
training wage) preconditions for the trainee’s access to vocational training. Several interviewees 
–  including  a number of high-volume,  low-intensity  employers in the construction sector  – 
alluded to this interlock, explaining that a key benefit of apprenticeship from their point of view 
was as an employee retention strategy. While there may be strong policy reasons for seeking to 
engage  employers  in the in-school training of  their  workers, the current indentureship 
mechanism has the potential to position employers as gatekeepers to publicly-provided training 
services that apprentices need, without imposing reciprocal controls over the quality or quantity 
of training that they provide in the workplace.  
Considerations for policy and research 
Current policies place urgent priority on raising rates of apprenticeship participation, in 
part through financial incentives to employers for indenturing apprentices. The present research 
challenges the reasoning behind this policy orientation. The findings cast new light on the 
apprenticeship mechanism’s actual contribution to the labour supply. And they challenge 
monolithic views of both the demand and supply sides of the skills system: on one hand, a 
supposedly distinct and homogeneous group of  “trades” occupations; and on the other a well-
matched, coherent skill formation system that is centred on employers’ workplace-based training 
efforts and supported against market failure by a variety of public inputs. What the findings 
reveal, instead, is a complex labour market where employers in different market niches, and 
under different regulatory and business conditions, incorporate different facets of the training 
system into different strategies for deploying and developing skill and managing its costs.  
In policy terms, this work argues for reconsidering current policies that reward employers 
for merely registering apprenticeship agreements: an approach evidently rooted in overestimating 
the  impact of  apprenticeship  on  “the trades”, and  of  registration  on  training.  Rather than 
continuing to treat apprenticeship enrolment as a goal in its own right, a clearer sense is needed 
of the links  between  fundamental  skills policy objectives and the  institutional  options  for 
pursuing them. Effective and efficient skills policies would adapt to and capitalize on the diverse 
needs, interests, capabilities, and strategies of labour market actors. The challenge is to reassess 
how particular tools – whether part of the existing apprenticeship toolbox or not – can be applied 
within a complex environment to achieve more fundamental objectives, whether in terms of 
labour supply, industrial innovation, economic productivity, or social inclusion.   
 
34 
In its particular combination of institutional parts, the Canadian approach to 
apprenticeship is an oddity in comparative terms. It is clearly very distant from the renowned 
German dual system with its very high participation rates, strict regulatory standards, and close 
collaboration among social partners. But it also stands in sharp contrast to the American model, 
where apprenticeship was all but abandoned in the early 19
th century in favour of institution-
based vocational training and a flexible industrial labour market. The Canadian system’s 
particular mix of features is likely the result of historical processes that could only be discovered 
through further research. Such research may point to strong advantages of the Canadian system. 
But it would be remiss if it did not also explore the relationship between Canada’s approach to 
industrial labour force development and its comparatively poor showing in terms of industrial 
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TABLE A1  Highest credential by occupation (N)   
    Source:  Statistics Canada Catalogue no: 97-564-X2006005 
  No degree  High School  Apprenticeship  College/Cegep  Othr deg <BA  BA and higher  Total 
1  H011 Suprvsrs, machinists & related occ's  1055  1530  2360  1995  270  535  7745 
2  H012 Contractors & suprvsrs, electrical trades & telecom'ns occ's  390  1430  5030  3390  385  595  11225 
3  H013 Contractors & suprvsrs, pipefitting trades  355  770  2605  1040  85  190  5050 
4  H014 Contractors & suprvsrs, metal forming, shaping & erecting trades  860  1380  4005  1350  155  195  7940 
5  H015 Contractors & suprvsrs, carpentry trades  2600  3380  4710  2680  370  840  14590 
6  H016 Contractors & suprvsrs, mechanic trades  1880  3240  7495  4275  580  695  18160 
7  H017 Contractors & suprvsrs, heavy construction equipment crews  6095  6715  4185  3065  535  825  21430 
8  H018 Suprvsrs, printing & related occ's  760  2030  1040  1155  260  695  5935 
9  H019 Contractors & suprvsrs, other construction…  5710  7095  5850  3440  670  1565  24335 
10  H021 Suprvsrs, railway transport operations  260  515  330  270  30  120  1530 
11  H022 Suprvsrs, motor transport & other ground transit operators  1270  2525  1220  1465  225  605  7310 
12  H111 Plumbers  3655  6380  24235  8755  780  1015  44820 
13  H112 Steamfitters, pipefitters & sprinkler system installers  1885  3715  11665  4070  445  410  22185 
14  H113 Gas fitters  250  415  3435  1245  150  155  5650 
15  H121 Carpenters  33590  40610  53030  22310  2730  5255  157525 
16  H122 Cabinetmakers  5010  6570  6935  4015  480  1370  24375 
17  H131 Bricklayers  4585  3895  7520  2205  275  415  18885 
18  H132 Concrete finishers  4510  3075  2655  885  130  180  11435 
19  H133 Tilesetters  2065  2460  2290  955  160  440  8370 
20  H134 Plasterers, drywall installers & finishers & lathers  11620  9455  8730  3065  395  770  34040 
21  H141 Roofers & shinglers  8470  6635  4750  1655  245  380  22140 
22  H142 Glaziers  2615  3300  2950  1200  140  305  10500 
23  H143 Insulators  2250  2100  3325  1020  125  160  8975 
24  H144 Painters & decorators  12860  16985  10445  5830  1120  2990  50225 
25  H145 Floor covering installers  4890  5985  3910  1685  290  560  17325 
26  H211 Electricians (except industrial & power system)  2195  9070  39385  17360  1815  2570  72395 
27  H212 Industrial electricians  545  1780  14270  10470  1050  1845  29960 
28  H213 Power system electricians  80  340  2530  2070  185  180  5380 
29  H214 Electrical power line & cable workers  725  1975  5745  2685  315  255  11695 
30  H215 Telecom'ns line & cable workers  850  3290  2100  2575  275  515  9610 
31  H216 Telecom'ns installation & repair workers  1120  6195  3820  8400  1265  2085  22895 
32  H217 Cable television service & maintenance technicians  455  1270  840  1385  150  330  4440 
33  H221 Stationary engineers & auxiliary equipment operators  1010  1110  6020  5780  735  795  15450  
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TABLE A1  Highest credential by occupation (N)   
    Source:  Statistics Canada Catalogue no: 97-564-X2006005 
  No degree  High School  Apprenticeship  College/Cegep  Othr deg <BA  BA and higher  Total 
34  H222 Power systems & power station operators  375  1395  1600  3065  365  635  7430 
35  H311 Machinists & machining & tooling inspectors  5175  8840  21480  12610  1495  2475  52075 
36  H312 Tool & die makers  1510  2715  5785  5980  630  600  17220 
37  H321 Sheet metal workers  2895  4085  10235  3330  400  370  21325 
38  H322 Boilermakers  345  430  2110  820  60  70  3830 
39  H323 Structural metal & platework fabricators & fitters  2315  3160  3700  1735  225  405  11540 
40  H324 Ironworkers  1960  2035  6505  1585  170  195  12450 
41  H325 Blacksmiths & die setters  300  265  130  95  25  55  875 
42  H326 Welders & related machine operators  15660  16915  50480  15985  1800  1680  102520 
43  H411 Construction millwrights & industrial mechanics (except textile)  7165  9585  34750  20130  1910  2355  75900 
44  H412 Heavy-duty equipment mechanics  4760  5025  19260  8770  805  520  39140 
45  H413 Refrigeration & air conditioning mechanics  1185  2485  10300  6585  740  945  22240 
46  H414 Railway carmen/women  330  825  1510  515  65  120  3360 
47  H415 Aircraft mechanics & aircraft inspectors  625  1725  4325  7150  1000  870  15690 
48  H416 Machine fitters  720  1210  1955  1240  85  140  5350 
49  H417 Textile machinery mechanics & repairers  465  435  245  210  0  50  1410 
50  H418 Elevator constructors & mechanics  225  500  1840  815  100  145  3620 
51  H421 Automotive service techns, truck & bus mechs & mech’l repairers  18695  21715  69725  33380  3370  3110  149990 
52  H422 Motor vehicle body repairers  6215  5895  13835  4270  590  445  31255 
53  H431 Oil & solid fuel heating mechanics  275  420  1215  485  65  85  2545 
54  H432 Electric appliance servicers & repairers  1065  1340  3105  1855  225  420  8005 
55  H433 Electrical mechanics  660  1065  3890  2000  280  355  8245 
56  H434 Motorcycle & other related mechanics  460  510  1630  780  45  40  3470 
57  H435 Other small engine & equipment mechanics  1190  1385  2725  1310  130  75  6815 
58  H511 Upholsterers  2020  1790  1165  655  180  195  5990 
59  H512 Tailors, dressmakers, furriers & milliners  7615  5805  2875  2505  615  875  20295 
60  H513 Shoe repairers & shoemakers  640  590  390  170  90  130  2010 
61  H514 Jewellers, watch repairers & related occ's  925  1435  1085  1225  295  705  5670 
62  H521 Printing press operators  4385  6925  5875  2975  430  685  21275 
63  H522 Commercial divers  85  155  360  285  30  70  985 
64  H523 Other trades & related occ's  1355  1820  3995  1785  185  270  9405 
65  H531 Residential & commercial installers & servicers  9920  12340  5670  4080  705  1715  34430 
66  H532 Waterworks & gas maintenance workers  790  1450  1170  920  65  190  4585  
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TABLE A1  Highest credential by occupation (N)   
    Source:  Statistics Canada Catalogue no: 97-564-X2006005 
  No degree  High School  Apprenticeship  College/Cegep  Othr deg <BA  BA and higher  Total 
67  H533 Automotive mechanical installers & servicers  4575  4890  1740  1260  205  190  12860 
68  H534 Pest controllers & fumigators  225  465  475  565  155  305  2195 
69  H535 Other repairers & servicers  2730  3500  1775  1775  245  885  10920 
70  H611 Heavy equipment operators (except crane)  30200  24535  19285  7120  735  840  82730 
71  H612 Public works maintenance equipment operators  5255  5080  3500  1410  270  285  15800 
72  H621 Crane operators  2885  3075  5535  1625  280  210  13615 
73  H622 Drillers & blasters - Surface mining, quarrying & construction  870  910  770  370  35  35  2990 
74  H623 Water well drillers  215  360  450  170  10  25  1225 
  Total  275730  336305  587865  297340  35930  53610  1586780  
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TABLE A2  Highest credential by occupation (%)   
    Source:  Statistics Canada Catalogue no: 97-564-X2006005 
  No degree  High School  Apprenticeship  College/Cegep  Othr deg <BA  BA and higher 
1  H011 Suprvsrs, machinists & related occ's  13.6  19.8  30.5  25.8  3.5  6.9 
2  H012 Contractors & suprvsrs, electrical trades & telecom'ns occ's  3.5  12.7  44.8  30.2  3.4  5.3 
3  H013 Contractors & suprvsrs, pipefitting trades  7.0  15.2  51.6  20.6  1.7  3.8 
4  H014 Contractors & suprvsrs, metal forming, shaping & erecting trades  10.8  17.4  50.4  17.0  2.0  2.5 
5  H015 Contractors & suprvsrs, carpentry trades  17.8  23.2  32.3  18.4  2.5  5.8 
6  H016 Contractors & suprvsrs, mechanic trades  10.4  17.8  41.3  23.5  3.2  3.8 
7  H017 Contractors & suprvsrs, heavy construction equipment crews  28.4  31.3  19.5  14.3  2.5  3.8 
8  H018 Suprvsrs, printing & related occ's  12.8  34.2  17.5  19.5  4.4  11.7 
9  H019 Contractors & suprvsrs, other construction …  23.5  29.2  24.0  14.1  2.8  6.4 
10  H021 Suprvsrs, railway transport operations  17.0  33.7  21.6  17.6  2.0  7.8 
11  H022 Suprvsrs, motor transport & other ground transit operators  17.4  34.5  16.7  20.0  3.1  8.3 
12  H111 Plumbers  8.2  14.2  54.1  19.5  1.7  2.3 
13  H112 Steamfitters, pipefitters & sprinkler system installers  8.5  16.7  52.6  18.3  2.0  1.8 
14  H113 Gas fitters  4.4  7.3  60.8  22.0  2.7  2.7 
15  H121 Carpenters  21.3  25.8  33.7  14.2  1.7  3.3 
16  H122 Cabinetmakers  20.6  27.0  28.5  16.5  2.0  5.6 
17  H131 Bricklayers  24.3  20.6  39.8  11.7  1.5  2.2 
18  H132 Concrete finishers  39.4  26.9  23.2  7.7  1.1  1.6 
19  H133 Tilesetters  24.7  29.4  27.4  11.4  1.9  5.3 
20  H134 Plasterers, drywall installers & finishers & lathers  34.1  27.8  25.6  9.0  1.2  2.3 
21  H141 Roofers & shinglers  38.3  30.0  21.5  7.5  1.1  1.7 
22  H142 Glaziers  24.9  31.4  28.1  11.4  1.3  2.9 
23  H143 Insulators  25.1  23.4  37.0  11.4  1.4  1.8 
24  H144 Painters & decorators  25.6  33.8  20.8  11.6  2.2  6.0 
25  H145 Floor covering installers  28.2  34.5  22.6  9.7  1.7  3.2 
26  H211 Electricians (except industrial & power system)  3.0  12.5  54.4  24.0  2.5  3.5 
27  H212 Industrial electricians  1.8  5.9  47.6  34.9  3.5  6.2 
28  H213 Power system electricians  1.5  6.3  47.0  38.5  3.4  3.3 
29  H214 Electrical power line & cable workers  6.2  16.9  49.1  23.0  2.7  2.2 
30  H215 Telecom'ns line & cable workers  8.8  34.2  21.9  26.8  2.9  5.4 
31  H216 Telecom'ns installation & repair workers  4.9  27.1  16.7  36.7  5.5  9.1 
32  H217 Cable television service & maintenance technicians  10.2  28.6  18.9  31.2  3.4  7.4 
33  H221 Stationary engineers & auxiliary equipment operators  6.5  7.2  39.0  37.4  4.8  5.1 
34  H222 Power systems & power station operators  5.0  18.8  21.5  41.3  4.9  8.5 
35  H311 Machinists & machining & tooling inspectors  9.9  17.0  41.2  24.2  2.9  4.8 
36  H312 Tool & die makers  8.8  15.8  33.6  34.7  3.7  3.5  
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TABLE A2  Highest credential by occupation (%)   
    Source:  Statistics Canada Catalogue no: 97-564-X2006005 
  No degree  High School  Apprenticeship  College/Cegep  Othr deg <BA  BA and higher 
37  H321 Sheet metal workers  13.6  19.2  48.0  15.6  1.9  1.7 
38  H322 Boilermakers  9.0  11.2  55.1  21.4  1.6  1.8 
39  H323 Structural metal & platework fabricators & fitters  20.1  27.4  32.1  15.0  1.9  3.5 
40  H324 Ironworkers  15.7  16.3  52.2  12.7  1.4  1.6 
41  H325 Blacksmiths & die setters  34.3  30.3  14.9  10.9  2.9  6.3 
42  H326 Welders & related machine operators  15.3  16.5  49.2  15.6  1.8  1.6 
43  H411 Construction millwrights & industrial mechanics (except textile)  9.4  12.6  45.8  26.5  2.5  3.1 
44  H412 Heavy-duty equipment mechanics  12.2  12.8  49.2  22.4  2.1  1.3 
45  H413 Refrigeration & air conditioning mechanics  5.3  11.2  46.3  29.6  3.3  4.2 
46  H414 Railway carmen/women  9.8  24.6  44.9  15.3  1.9  3.6 
47  H415 Aircraft mechanics & aircraft inspectors  4.0  11.0  27.6  45.6  6.4  5.5 
48  H416 Machine fitters  13.5  22.6  36.5  23.2  1.6  2.6 
49  H417 Textile machinery mechanics & repairers  33.0  30.9  17.4  14.9  0.0  3.5 
50  H418 Elevator constructors & mechanics  6.2  13.8  50.8  22.5  2.8  4.0 
51  H421 Automotive service techns, truck & bus mechs & mech’l repairers  12.5  14.5  46.5  22.3  2.2  2.1 
52  H422 Motor vehicle body repairers  19.9  18.9  44.3  13.7  1.9  1.4 
53  H431 Oil & solid fuel heating mechanics  10.8  16.5  47.7  19.1  2.6  3.3 
54  H432 Electric appliance servicers & repairers  13.3  16.7  38.8  23.2  2.8  5.2 
55  H433 Electrical mechanics  8.0  12.9  47.2  24.3  3.4  4.3 
56  H434 Motorcycle & other related mechanics  13.3  14.7  47.0  22.5  1.3  1.2 
57  H435 Other small engine & equipment mechanics  17.5  20.3  40.0  19.2  1.9  1.1 
58  H511 Upholsterers  33.7  29.9  19.4  10.9  3.0  3.3 
59  H512 Tailors, dressmakers, furriers & milliners  37.5  28.6  14.2  12.3  3.0  4.3 
60  H513 Shoe repairers & shoemakers  31.8  29.4  19.4  8.5  4.5  6.5 
61  H514 Jewellers, watch repairers & related occ's  16.3  25.3  19.1  21.6  5.2  12.4 
62  H521 Printing press operators  20.6  32.5  27.6  14.0  2.0  3.2 
63  H522 Commercial divers  8.6  15.7  36.5  28.9  3.0  7.1 
64  H523 Other trades & related occ's  14.4  19.4  42.5  19.0  2.0  2.9 
65  H531 Residential & commercial installers & servicers  28.8  35.8  16.5  11.9  2.0  5.0 
66  H532 Waterworks & gas maintenance workers  17.2  31.6  25.5  20.1  1.4  4.1 
67  H533 Automotive mechanical installers & servicers  35.6  38.0  13.5  9.8  1.6  1.5 
68  H534 Pest controllers & fumigators  10.3  21.2  21.6  25.7  7.1  13.9 
69  H535 Other repairers & servicers  25.0  32.1  16.3  16.3  2.2  8.1 
70  H611 Heavy equipment operators (except crane)  36.5  29.7  23.3  8.6  0.9  1.0 
71  H612 Public works maintenance equipment operators  33.3  32.2  22.2  8.9  1.7  1.8 
72  H621 Crane operators  21.2  22.6  40.7  11.9  2.1  1.5  
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TABLE A2  Highest credential by occupation (%)   
    Source:  Statistics Canada Catalogue no: 97-564-X2006005 
  No degree  High School  Apprenticeship  College/Cegep  Othr deg <BA  BA and higher 
73  H622 Drillers & blasters - Surface mining, quarrying & construction  29.1  30.4  25.8  12.4  1.2  1.2 
74  H623 Water well drillers  17.6  29.4  36.7  13.9  0.8  2.0 





TABLE A3  Estimated contribution of apprenticeship training to the labour force  in 
selected apprenticeable trades (%)  





Trade certificates granted to 
registered apprentices** 
Labour force  
contribution of 
apprenticeship*** 
Boilermakers   55  87  48 
Plumbers   54  88  48 
Sheet metal workers   48  88  42 
Elect pwr  & cable wkrs   49  81  40 
Oil & s.f. heating mechs   48  83  40 
Electricians I  54  72  39 
Gas fitters   61  63  38 
Ironworkers   52  69  36 
HD Equip mechs   49  72  35 
Auto/bus/truck svc techs   47  70  33 
Machinists   41  80  33 
Bricklayers   40  79  32 
Insulators   37  85  31 
Steam/pipe/spklr fitters   53  52  28 
Refrig & A/C mechs   46  60  28 
MV body repairers   44  64  28 
Struct metal fabrctrs   32  83  27 
Tool & die makers   34  77  26 
Welders   49  51  25 
Carpenters   34  70  24 
Construction millwrights   46  51  23 
Crane operators-  41  57  23 
Glaziers   28  71  20 
Industrial electricians   48  40  19 
Concrete finishers   23  70  16 
Roofers & shinglers   22  55  12 
Painters & decorators   21  52  11 
Floor covering installers   23  27  6 
Power syst/station oprtrs   22  21  5 
* Percentage of workers reporting a trade certificate as their highest educational credential. Source: 2006 Census. 
** Percentage of trade certificates granted by provincial authorities to registered apprentices in the occupation, Canada total, 1997-2006. 
Source: RAIS. Note: Percentages are approximate. 
*** Product of A and B. Percentages should be read with caution due to rounding error and differences between the NOC-S and RAIS definitions 
of some occupations.   
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CHART A1  Prevalence  
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TABLE A4  Workplace characteristics 
ID  Type  Trade  Size  Regl’n  Union  Ratio  Costs  Practice  Capacity  Ethos 
HIGH INVESTORS 
Group H1  High value operations    
01  Gen contractor  Carpenter  5-10  None  None  1:4  Med  High  High  High 
02  Flooring contr  Flooring mech  20-50  Strong  Craft  1:4  High  High  High  High 
03  Electrical contr  Electrician  20-50  Strong  Craft  1:2  Med  High  High  High 
04  Electrical contr  Electrician  >50  Strong  Craft  1:1  Low  Med  High  High 
05  Auto dealership  Auto Svc Tech  5-10  Strong  None  1:1  Low  High  High  High 
06  Auto dealership  Auto Svc Tec  20-50  Strong  None  1:4  Med  High  High  High 
07  Truck & diesel   HD/CV Mech  5-10  Strong  Craft  1:9  High  High  High  High 
                     
Group H2  Regulated utilities   
08  Powerline cont  Powerline tech  20-50  Strong  Craft  1:2  High  High  High  High 
09  Municip garage  HD/CV Mech  >50  Strong  Public  1:2.5  High  High  High  High 
10  Transit garage  HD/CV Mech  >50  Strong  Indust  1:6  High  High  High  High 
11  School Dist.  Multiple  >50  Strong  Public  n/a  n/a  -n/a  Low  High 
LOW INVESTORS 
Group L1 Independent artisans   
12  Building contr  Carpenter  <5  None  None  n/a  Low  Med  Med  Low 
13  Auto service  Auto Svc Tech  <5  Weak  None  1:2  Low  Med  Med  High 
14  Auto & tire svc  Auto Svc Tech  5-10  Weak  None  n/a  Low  Low  Low  Med 
15  Auto repair & 
body 
Auto Svc Tech  3  Weak  None  1:1  Low  Low  Low  Low 
16  Auto body  Auto bdy tech  4  None  None  n/a  -  -  Low  Low 
17  Truck & trnsp   HD/CV Mech  5-10  Weak  None  1:1.5  Low  Low  Med  Low 
 
Group L2  High volume construction 
18  Gen contractor  Carpenter  20-50  None  None  4:1  Low  Low  Low  Low 
19  Gen contractor  Carpenter  >50  Weak  Indust  1:2  Low  Low  Med  Low 
20  Gen contractor  Carpenter  20-50  Weak  Indust  2:1  Low  Low  Low  Low 
21  Wall & ceiling   Drywall mech  20-50  Weak  Craft  3:1  L/med  Low  Med  Low 
22  Mechanical cont  Plumber  20-50  Weak  Craft  2:1  Low  Low  Med  Low 
23  Painting contr  Painter  20-50  None  None  3:1  Low  Low  Low  Low 
24  Electrical contr  Electrician  20-50  Weak  None  2:1  Low  Low  Low  Low 
 
Group L3  Craft skeptics 
25  Gen contractor  Carpenter  11-20  Weak  None  1:3  Low  Med  Med  Low 
26  Gen contractor  Carpenter  11-20  Weak  Indust  1:4  Low  Low  Med  Low 
 
Group L4   Flat rate shops 
27  Auto & tire svc  Auto Svc Tech  5-10  Strong  None  1:25  Med  Med  Med  Med 
28  Auto body  Auto Body Tech  50+  Strong  None  1:2?  Med  Low  Med  Low 
29  Auto dealer  Auto Svc Tech  5-10  Strong  None  1:7  Med  High  Med  High 
 
Group L5  Non-participants 
30  Framing contr  Carpenter  2  None  None  n/a  Low  Low  Very low  Low 
31  Siding contr  Siding appl  4  None  None  n/a  Low  Low  Very low  Low 
32  Flooring contr  Flooring mech  5-10  None  None  n/a  Low  Low  Very low  Med 
24  Brake & muffler  Installer/AST  3  None  None  n/a  Low  Low  Low  Low 
 